What are the essential elements of technically credible, workable, and publicly acceptable regulations for disposal (in geologic repositories)?
The U.S. Government is seeking a site for a monitored retrievable storage facility (MRS). Employing proven technologies used in this country and abroad, the MRS will be an integral part of the Federal system for safe and permanent disposal of the nation's high-level radioactive wastes. The MRS will accept shipments of spent fuel from commerical nuclear power plants, temporarily store the spent fuel above ground, and stage shipments of it to a geologic repository for permanent disposal.
Presented to the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future Subcommittee on Disposal
This report puts forth a number of options and recommendations for how to engage stakeholders and other members of the public in the storage and management of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste in the United States. The options are generated from a scientific review of existing publications proposing criteria for assessing past efforts to engage publics and stakeholders in decision-making about risky technologies.
On the historic evidence, but also for the distinctive qualities of the challenge, nuclear waste siting conflicts are assuredly among the most refractory in the large variety of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) facility siting disputes. Since the president brought the Yucca Mountain process to a halt in 2010 (or, more accurately, issued its death certificate), the search for a permanent waste fuel repository is at the starting line again.
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America_s Nuclear Future (BRC) was formed by the Secretary<br>of Energy at the request of the President to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for<br>managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and recommend a new strate
The purpose of this study is to assist decision makers in evaluating the centralized interim<br>storage option. We explore the economics of centralized interim storage under a wide variety of<br>circumstances. We look at how a commitment to move forward with centralized interim storage<br>today could evolve over time. And, we evaluate the costs of reversing a commitment toward<br>centralized storage if it turns out that such a decision is later considered a mistake.
The principal factors that affected the scope of scientific investigations at Yucca Mountain over the last 20 years included both regulatory and technical aspects. Examples of regulatory factors include the regulations themselves as well as the associated quality assurance requirements. Examples of technical factors include the repository and waste package designs, new information that affected the post-closure safety basis, and technical reviews from peers, stakeholders and the regulators.
In 2010, there were no events that posed a serious radiological threat to the population in Slovenia. There were also no particularities in relation to the services of radiation practices and operators of radiation facilities.
The Krško NPP operated without shutdowns and production was interrupted only for the annual outage. In 2010, the power plant produced 5.7 TWh in total and achieved 89.9% availability. The nuclear power plant had no major problems during the September floods, when the Sava river otherwise seriously threatened settlements in Posavje.
Presented to the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future Subcommittee on Disposal
