This test protocols report presents the NRC staff’s preliminary plans for an experimental phase of the Package Performance Study (PPS), which is examining the response of transportation casks to extreme transportation accident conditions. The staff proposes to conduct tests of full-scale rail and full-scale truck casks including a high-speed impact with an unyielding surface followed by an extreme fire test. The NRC has a contract in place with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to conduct the impact and fire tests and to carry out a series of analyses to support the test program.

This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development Department (WPDD) to determine the viability of the Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Glass waste package concept with respect to criticality regulatory requirements in compliance with the goals of the Waste Package Implementation Plan (Ref. 5.1) for conceptual design. These design calculations are performed in sufficient detail to provide a comprehensive comparison base with other design alternatives.

This technical report provides an updated summary of the waste package (WP) external criticalityrelated
risk of the plutonium disposition ceramic waste form, which is being developed and
evaluated by the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
The ceramic waste form consists of Pu immobilized in ceramic disks, which would be embedded
in High-Level Waste (HLW) glass in the HLW glass disposal canisters, known as the "can-incanister"

The objective of this analysis is to characterize the criticality safety aspects of a degraded Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel (DOE-SNF) canister containing Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or Oak Ridge Research (ORR) fuel in the Five-Pack Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) waste package to demonstrate concept viability related to use in the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) environment for the postclosure time frame.

This study describes the development of a preliminary throughput estimate for a Wet Handling Facility (WHF)/ used fuel repackaging factility. This study estimates the throughput for the WHF License Application design for a repository at Yucca Mountain as of September 2007. This design freeze allowed for the development of the throughput study without having to accommodate for minor updates to the facility design and documentation leading up to the License Application.

Ever since the 1950s, plutonium, used in fas reactors, has been seen as the key to unlocking the vast energy resource contained in the the world's uranium reserves. However, the reductions in expected nuclear reactor installation rates, combined with discovery of additional uranium, have led to a lengthening in the perceived time interval before fast reactors, the most effective users of plutonium, will make large demands on plutonium supplies. THere are several options concerning its use or storage in the meantime.

This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development (WPD) department to provide a probabilistic evaluation of the potential for criticality of fissile material which has been transported from a geologic repository containing breached waste packages of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This analysis is part of a continuing investigation of the probability of criticality resulting from the emplacement of spent nuclear fuel in a geologic repository.

The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of Department of Energy (DOE) standardized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) canisters. It is intended that the results of the criticality safety calculations provided in this document will

The criticality consequence analysis for pressurized water reactor (PWR) waste packages (WP)
(Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System [CRWMS] Management and Operating
Contractor [M&O] 1997) focused on results obtained by maximizing postulated rates of
reactivity insertion to assure no synergistic reactions could occur among waste packages from
hypothetical criticality events. Other variables potentially influencing the criticality
consequences were held constant during the above referenced analysis. One of those variables

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft Nuclear Waste Administration Act (NWAA). The ANS is a not-for-profit, international, scientific, and educational organization with nearly 12,000 members worldwide. The core purpose of ANS is to promote awareness and understanding of the application of nuclear science and technology. As an organization, it has published a number of position statements regarding the issue of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

The purpose of this calculation is to characterize the criticality aspect of the codisposal of TRIGA (Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomic) reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with Savannah River Site (SRS) high-level waste (HLW). The TRIGA SNF is loaded into a Department of Energy (DOE) standardized SNF canister which is centrally positioned inside five-canister defense SRS HLW waste package (WP). The objective of the calculation is to investigate the criticality issues for the WP containing the five SRS HLW and DOE SNF canisters in various stages of degradation.

This topical report describes the approach to the risk-informed, performance-based methodology to be used for performing postclosure criticality analyses for waste forms in the Monitored Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The risk-informed, performance-based methodology will be used during the licensing process to demonstrate how the potential for postclosure criticality will be limited and to demonstrate that public health and safety are protected against postclosure criticality.

In February 1996, the Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned a comprehensive effort to document and declassify the United States inventory and other information needed to present a complete picture of the production, acquisition, and utilization of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Highly Enriched Uranium:Striking A Balance presents the results of that study.

The objective of this calculation is to evaluate the required minimum burnup as a function of initial boiling water reactor (BWR) assembly enrichment that would permit loading of spent nuclear fuel into the 44 BWR waste package configuration as provided in Attachment IV. This calculation is an application of the methodology presented in ''Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report'' (YMP 2003). The scope of this calculation covers a range of enrichments from 0 through 5.0 weight percent (wt%) U-235, and a burnup range of 0 through 40 GWd/MTU.

The purpose of this document is to summarize the degraded waste package disposal criticality evaluations which were reported in FY 1997 (Refs. 2-6), and to explain how those evaluations have served to further develop various aspects of the overall methodology for such evaluations.

The purpose of this document is to evaluate the potential for criticality for the fissile material that could accumulate in the near-field (invert) and in the far-field (host rock) beneath the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) codisposal waste packages (WPs) as they degrade in the proposed monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. The scope of this calculation is limited to the following DOE SNF types: Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), Enrico Fermi, Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), Fort St.

US DOE collaborated with state and tribal stakeholders in the National Transportation Stakeholders Forum (NTSF) Communications ad hoc working group to develop a guide for site personnel to follow when preparing campaign-specific fact sheets.

The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the transient behavior and consequences of a worst case criticality event involving intact pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a degraded basket configuration inside a 21 PWR assembly waste package (WP). The objective of this analysis is to demonstrate that the consequences of a worst case criticality event involving intact PWR SNF are insignificant in their effect on the overall radioisotopic inventory in a WP. An internal WP criticality is modeled in a manner analogous to transient phenomena in a nuclear reactor core.

This document provides specifications for selected system components of the Transportation, Aging and Disposal (TAD) canister-based system. A list of

The General Accounting Office examined DOE's "program to ship damaged nuclear fuel from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory." The report was requested by Reps. William L. Clay, Richard A. Gephardt, and Alan Wheat.

The objective of this calculation is to determine the structural response of the 5-DHLW/DOE (Defense High Level Waste/Department of Energy) SNF (Spent Nuclear Fuel) Short Co-disposal Waste Package (WP) when subjected (while in the horizontal orientation emplaced in the drift) to a collision by a loaded (with WP) Transport and Emplacement Vehicle (TEV) due to an over-run. The scope of this calculation is limited to reporting the calculation results in terms of maximum total stress intensities (SIs) in the outer corrosion barrier (OCB).

The objective of this calculation is to characterize the nuclear criticality safety concerns
associated with the codisposal of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Enrico Fermi (EF) Spent
Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in a 5-Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Waste Package (WP) and
placed in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). The scope of this calculation is limited to
the determination of the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) for the degraded mode
internal configurations of the codisposal WP. The results of this calculation and those of Ref. 8

This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development (WPD) department to provide an evaluation of the criticality potential within a waste package having some or all of its contents degraded by corrosion and removal of neutron absorbers. This analysis is also intended to provide an estimate of the consequences of any internal criticality, particularly in terms of any increase in radionuclide inventory. These consequence estimates will be used as part of the WPD input to the Total System Performance Assessment.

The purpose of this calculation is to perform partially and fully degraded mode criticality evaluations of plutonium disposed of in a ceramic waste form and emplaced in a Monitored Geologic Repository. The partially degraded mode is represented by the immobilized plutonium ceramic discs piled in the bottom of the waste package (WP) while neutron absorbers begin to leach out of the discs.

The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate the transient behavior and consequences of a worstcase
criticality event involving intact pressurized water reactor (PWR) mixed-oxide (MOX)
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a degraded basket configuration inside a 21 PWR waste package
(WP). This calculation will provide information necessary for demonstrating that the
consequences of a worst-case criticality event involving intact PWR MOX SNF are insignificant
in their effect on the overall radioisotopic inventory and on the integrity of the repository. This