The Siting Record
The Siting Record
An Account of the Programs of Federal Agencies and Events That Have Led to the Selection of a Potential Site for a Geologic Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste
An Account of the Programs of Federal Agencies and Events That Have Led to the Selection of a Potential Site for a Geologic Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste
The validity of the computation of pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) spent fuel isotopic
composition by the SCALE system depletion analysis was assessed using data presented in the report.
Radiochemical measurements and SCALE/SAS2H computations of depleted fuel isotopics were
compared with 19 benchmark-problem samples from Calvert Cliffs Unit 1, H. B. Robinson Unit 2,
and Obrigheim PWRs. Even though not exhaustive in scope, the validation included comparison of
predicted and measured concentrations for 14 actinides and 37 fission and activation products.
This report provides details of dry storage cask systems and contents in U.S. for commercial light water
reactor fuel. Section 2 contains details on the canisters used to store approximately 86% of assemblies in
dry storage in the U.S. Transport cask details for bare fuels, dual purpose casks and canister transport
casks are included in Section 3. Section 4 details the inventory of those shutdown sites without any
operating reactors. Information includes the cask type deployed, transport license and status as well as
Gentlemen,
In accordance with the charter of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future and as the Secretary's designee, I approve your request to establish an ad hoc subcommittee to review and make a recommendation to the Commission regarding the co-mingling of defense and commercial waste.
This letter also serves to appoint Dr. Allison Macfarlane as the chair of the subcommittee and the membership of the subcommittee as identified in your letter to me dated October 31, 2011.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform intact mode and partially degraded mode criticality evaluations of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Enrico Fermi (EF) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) co-disposed in a 5 Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Waste Package (WP) and emplaced in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). The criticality evaluations estimate the values of the effective neutron multiplication factor, keff, as a measure of nuclear criticality potential, for the 5- DHLW/DOE SNF WP with intact or partially degraded internal configurations.
This report presents the analysis and conclusions with respect to disposal criticality for canisters containing aluminum-based fuels from research reactors. The analysis has been divided into three phases. Phase I, dealt with breached and flooded waste packages containing relatively intact canisters and intact internal (basket) structures; Phase II, the subject of this report, covers the degradation of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and structures internal to the codisposal waste package including high level waste (HLW), canisters, and criticality control material.
The first objective of this calculation is the identification of the degraded configurations of the Enhanced Design Alternatives (EDA) II design that have some possibility of criticality and that can occur within 10,000 years of placement in the repository. The next objective is to evaluate the criticality of these configurations and to estimate the probability of occurrence for those configurations that could support criticality.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform an example criticality evaluation for degraded internal configurations of a boiling water reactor (BWR) waste package (WP) containing 44 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies. The BWR assembly design considered is based on the General Electric (GE) 8x8 assembly (see section 5.1). Depletion analyses for various assembly average enrichment and burnup (expressed as gigawatt days/metric ton Uranium; GWd/MTU) combinations are performed using the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S sequence of SCALE 4.3 (CSCI:30011-2002; Ref. 7.5).
This design calculation is a revision of the previous criticality evaluation of the operations and
processes that are performed in the Aging Facility. It will also demonstrate and assure that the
storage and aging operations to be performed in the Aging Facility meet the criticality safety
design criteria in the Project Design Criteria Document (BSC 2005i, Section 4.9.2.2), and the
nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the SNF Aging System Description Document
US policy for management of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and high level radioactive wastes (HLRW) is at a crossroads, and the success of new policy directions will depend in part on broad public acceptance and support. In this paper I provide an overview of the evidence concerning the beliefs and concerns of members of the American public regarding UNF and HLNW. I also characterize the evidence on American’s policy preferences for management of these materials.
This report summarizes the results of an initial investigation into the uncertainties associated with the burnup records maintained by nuclear power plants. The results indicate that there is an overall uncertainty of about 2 percent in the burnup records, which must be accounted for in spent fuel applications.
The objective of this calculation is to characterize the criticality aspect of a Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE SNF) canister containing 5 Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) assemblies in a Five-Pack Defense High-Level Waste (HLW) waste package(WP). The purpose of this calculation is to investigate the criticality issues for the WP containg HLW and DOE SNF canisters in various stages of degradation. The calculational method used to perform the criticality calculations consisted of using the MNCP Version 4B2 (Ref.
The purpose of this design analysis is to determine the accuracy of the SAS2H module of SCALE 4.3 in predicting isotopic concentrations of spent fuel assemblies. The objective is to develop a methodology for modeling assemblies similar to those evaluated within this analysis and to establish the consistency of SAS2H predictions. The results of this analysis may then be applied to future depletion calculations using SAS2H in which no measurements are available.
How to dispose of highly radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants is a question that has remained unresolved in the face rapidly changing technological, economic, and political requirements. In the three decades following WWII, two federal agencies -- the Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration -- tried unsuccessfully to develop a satisfactory plan for managing high level wastes.
The objective of this calculation is to characterize the criticality aspect of a Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE SNF) canister containing 5 Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) assemblies in a Five-Pack defense High-Level Waste (HLW) waste package. The purpose of this calculation is to investigate the criticality issues for the waste package (WP) containing HLW and DOE SNF canisters in various stages of degradation.
The management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and defense high level waste (HLW) is a complex sociotechnical
systems challenge. Coordinated, reliable, and safe performance will be required over very long
periods of time within evolving social and technical contexts. To accomplish these goals, a waste
management system will involve a host of facilities for interim storage and longterm disposal, a
transportation infrastructure, and research and development centers. The complexity of SNF and HLW
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
The objective of this safety requirements publication is to set down the protection objectives and criteria for geological disposal and to establish the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of this disposal option, consistent with the established principles of safety for radioactive waste management.
About 20,000 metric tons of spent, or used, nuclear
fuel have accumulated since the beginning of commercial
nuclear power prbduction in the United States. At the end
of the currently licensed period of all existing nuclear power
plants and those under construction, the amount of spent
nuclear fuel is expected to total 87,000 metric tons.
Thus far, practically all of the spent nuclear fuel is
stored in water-filled pools at reactor sites. However, space
does not exist in the pools to store all the spent fuel expected
To achieve energy security and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction objectives, the United States must develop and deploy clean, affordable, domestic energy sources as quickly as possible. Nuclear power will continue to be a key component of a portfolio of technologies that meets our energy goals. This document provides a roadmap for the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) research, development, and demonstration activities that will ensure nuclear energy remains viable energy option for the United States.
The purpose of this design analysis is to determine the accuracy of the SAS2H module of SCALE 4.3 in predicting isotopic concentrations of spent fuel assemblies. The objective is to develop a methodology for modeling assemblies similar to those evaluated within this analysis and to establish the consistency of SAS2H predictions. The results of this analysis may then be applied·to future depletion calculations using SAS2H in which no measurements are available. ·
Every year, more than 300 million packages of hazardous material are shipped in the
United States (U.S.). Most of the hazardous material shipped – about 97 percent – is
flammable, explosive, corrosive or poisonous. About 1 percent – three million packages –
of the hazardous materials shipped annually contains radioactive material, most of them
from medical and industrial applications. [DOT 1998b]
Spent nuclear fuel comprises a very small fraction of the hazardous materials packages
The purpose of this calculation is to determine the required minimum burnup as a function of initial pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly enrichment that would permit loading of fuel into the 21 PWR waste package (WP), as provided for in QAP-2-0 Activity Evaluation, Perform Criticality, Thermal, Structural, & Shielding Analyses (Reference 7.1).