Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
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| nas_internat_of_fuel_cycle_2008.pdf (1.24 MB) | 1.24 MB |
Following the proposals for nuclear fuel assurance of International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed El Baradei, former Russian President Vladimir V.
Putin, and U.S. President George W. Bush, joint committees of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (RAS) and the U.S. National Academies (NAS) were formed to address these and other
fuel assurance concepts and their links to nonproliferation goals. The joint committees also
addressed many technology issues relating to the fuel assurance concepts. This report provides
background information and support for the following consensus findings and recommendations
of the joint committees:
Finding 1a
By 2020, many countries that currently do not have a nuclear power plant are likely to initiate
national programs for the construction of nuclear power stations.1 These countries do not now
have facilities for uranium enrichment for nuclear fuel production or spent nuclear fuel
reprocessing.
Finding 1b
Uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing are the key technologies that enable countries to
produce direct-use materials for nuclear weapons.2 The more countries to which either
technology (enrichment or reprocessing) spreads, the greater the proliferation risks. Currently it
appears that more countries that have not already deployed these technologies are interested in
establishing uranium enrichment programs than in pursuing spent fuel reprocessing technologies,
making the spread of enrichment technology a greater near-term concern for nuclear
proliferation. But the intention to acquire spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities was the
main focus of proliferation concerns in the 1970s and could become so again.
...
