Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle--Goals, Strategies, and Challenges

The so-called nuclear renaissance has increased worldwide interest in nuclear power.
This potential growth also has increased, in some quarters, concern that nonproliferation
considerations are not being given sufficient attention. In particular, since the introduction of
many new power reactors will lead to requiring an increase in uranium enrichment services to
provide the reactor fuel, the proliferation risk of adding enrichment facilities in countries that do
not have them now led to proposals to provide the needed fuel without requiring new indigenous
enrichment facilities. Similar concerns exist for reprocessing facilities.
In 2006, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, and U.S. President George W. Bush each
announced plans to assure the provision of fuel to countries that want to develop nuclear power.
The proposals were aimed at dissuading these countries from building uranium enrichment plants
because such plants could be used to produce weapons-usable highly enriched uranium. In the
spring of 2006, members of the Committees on International Security and Arms Control of the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), which
have had a productive partnership for more than 25 years, met with each other, with senior
officials in their respective governments, and with Director General ElBaradei to identify issues
of national and international importance on which independent advice from the two academies
would be useful.
With funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, two committees with members appointed by the NAS and the RAS,
working jointly, produced this report analyzing the proposals and options for future international
nuclear fuel cycles, including the incentives that might be required for countries to accept fuel
assurance guarantees and not develop enrichment or reprocessing facilities, as well as technical
fuel-cycle issues. The statement of task for this study can be found in Appendix A. The task
notes that this report is not intended to cover the policy and technical aspects of international fuel
cycles comprehensively. Rather, the joint committees summarize key issues and analyses, offer
some criteria for evaluating options, and make findings and recommendations to help the United
States, the Russian Federation, and the international community reduce proliferation and other
risks as nuclear power is used more widely.
This report is intended for all those who are concerned about the need for assuring fuel
for new reactors and at the same time limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. This audience
includes the United States and Russia, other nations that currently supply nuclear material and
technology, many other countries contemplating starting or growing nuclear power programs,
and the international organizations that support the safe, secure functioning of the international
nuclear fuel cycle, most prominently the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Fuel assurance proposals have been discussed in conferences and journal articles.
However, to receive input from the countries that might use the fuel assurance program, the joint
committees held a workshop at the IAEA in April 2007, where people from eight countries
presented their opinions or comments on the fuel assurance programs. While not officially
representing their governments, these experts provided valuable insights into the issues that must be addressed for the fuel assurance programs to succeed. Appendix B of the report contains a
summary of the workshop. The joint committees also addressed technologies being developed
for new approaches to reprocessing (also called recycling and regeneration) and possible
advanced reactors. While these discussions are necessarily limited due to the technologies being
in the early stages of development or existing only as concepts, some advantages and
disadvantages are discussed.
The joint committees addressed the different elements of the statement of task at different
levels. Much of Part B of the task calls for comparisons of technologies in Russia with those
envisaged in the United States. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) comprises two
initiatives from President George W. Bush. One is an international initiative beginning with an
accord expressing the signatories’ guiding principles for expansion of nuclear power. The other
is a domestic nuclear energy and fuel cycle technology initiative with seven different goals. The
international initiative has garnered dozens of partners. The domestic technology initiative has
shifted its focus, emphasis, and timeline several times over the course of the study. These
changes were significant, from switches among advanced fuel processing technologies that are
mostly in the research phase and evolutionary commercial fuel-processing technologies to
different fuels manufactured with as-yet-to-be-developed technologies. For these reasons, the
joint committees were unable to compare the concrete Russian technological options with the
multitude under consideration in GNEP. Because the Russian approaches have been developed
more fully and in many cases the Russian government has selected particular approaches for
deployment, these approaches are described in more detail in this report than the early-stage
concepts being considered in the U.S. Technologies in related areas being pursued in other
countries were beyond the joint committees’ charge, and are considered only in passing here.
We wish to thank the IAEA, especially Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, Deputy
Director General Yuri Sokolov, and Tariq Rauf for their support of our international workshop
held in Vienna. We also thank Alan MacDonald of the IAEA for his substantial assistance in
arranging the workshop. We thank the workshop attendees and the presenters at the joint
committee meetings in the United States and Russia who provided us with their expert
knowledge (see Appendix E).
We especially thank Yuri Shiyan of the RAS, Micah Lowenthal, NAS Study Director,
and Rita Guenther of the NAS. Without the tireless work of these three individuals, the report
would not have been completed.
This joint study addresses some of the serious international issues connecting the spread
of nuclear power and nonproliferation concerns. The NAS and RAS have met and worked
together for many decades on issues related to science and technology, including decades of
dialogues and, more recently, joint studies on international security problems. We strongly
believe that inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities while promoting better access
to safe, clean energy is in the interests of Russia, the United States, and the larger world
community. It is precisely at times like these, then, that cooperation is needed between our
scientific communities to help focus on those common interests and promote efforts toward
common goals. The need for such cooperation grows under the conditions we see today.