Managing Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

After more than 20 years of commercial nuclear power, the Federal
Government has yet to develop a broadly supported policy for fulfilling
its legal responsibility for the final isolation of high-level radioactive waste.
OTA's study concludes that until such a policy is adopted in law, there
is a substantial risk that the false starts, shifts of policy, and fluctuating support
that have plagued the final isolation program in the past will continue.
Final isolation-the last step in radioactive waste management-is intended
to limit or prevent the release of highly radioactive byproducts of
nuclear fission into the environment for the thousands of years that it takes
for the radioactivity to decay to low levels. Nearly all of the radioactive
byproducts produced thus far by commercial nuclear power are contained
in spent (used) fuel-about 8,000 metric tons-that is temporarily
stored in water-filled basins at operating reactors. The original expectation
that all spent fuel would be reprocessed to recover usable uranium and
plutonium, and that the radioactive byproducts would be separated as highlevel
waste, has not been realized. Since it now appears possible that at
least some spent fuel may never be reprocessed, the term high-level radioactive
waste applies in this report to both high-level waste from reprocessing
and any spent fuel discarded directly as waste.
The continued lack of final isolation facilities has raised two key problems
that underlie debates about radioactive waste policy. First, some question
the continued use of nuclear power until it is shown that safe final
isolation for the resulting wastes can and will be accomplished, and argue
that the failure to develop final isolation facilities is evidence that it may
be an insoluble problem. Second, because there are no reprocessing facilities
or Federal waste isolation facilities to accept spent fuel, existing reactors
are running out of spent fuel storage space, and by 1986 some may
face a risk of shutting down for some period if there are delays in efforts
to provide additional storage capacity. Because the 1990's are the earliest
that facilities for reprocessing or final isolation could be available, most
of the 72,000 metric tons of spent fuel expected to be generated by the
year 2000 will still be in temporary storage at that time.
Given its statutory role, the central issue for the Federal Government
in final isolation is how strong a commitment it will now make to develop
disposal facilities-which provide final isolation through use of manmade
and natural barriers, rather than through the continued human control and
maintenance required by storage. The disposal technology at the most advanced
stage of development is the mined geologic repository-a mined
facility several thousand feet deep in a geologic formation in which carefully
packaged radioactive waste is buried. There appear to be no insurmountable
technical obstacles to developing such repositories to meet tentative
Environmental Protection Agency safety criteria at a cost of no more than
a few percent of the total cost of nuclear power, provided that suitable
sites can be found. Three or four such repositories will probably accommodate
all of the radioactive waste expected to be generated by the reactors
now in operation and under construction.
While it is possible that utilities could provide all necessary additional
storage at reactor sites before existing basins are filled, some supplemental
storage may be needed if there are delays in their efforts. The role of
the Federal Government in providing such storage is a major unresolved
issue. The lack of a stable and credible policy for final isolation has become
a source of increasing opposition to both Federal and private efforts to provide
interim spent fuel storage facilities, because of fears that such facilities
would become de facto permanent waste repositories. Even after disposal
facilities are developed, the United States may continue to store spent fuel
for possible reprocessing or other reasons. But until such facilities are
developed-which will take over a decade-the United States will have
no choice but continued storage.
The greatest single obstacle that a successful waste management program
must overcome is the severe erosion of public confidence in the
Federal Government that past problems have created. Federal credibility
is questioned on three main grounds: 1) whether the Federal Government
will stick to any waste policy through changes of administration; 2)
whether it has the institutional capacity to carry out a technically complex
and politically sensitive program over a period of decades; and 3)
whether it can be trusted to respond adequately to the concerns of States
and others who will be affected by the waste management program.
OTAfs analysis suggests that, if history is not to repeat itself, and the current
stalemate on nuclear waste is not to continue, a comprehensive policy
is needed that addresses the near-term problems of interim storage as part
of an explicit and credible program for dealing with the longer term problem
of developing a final isolation system. Such a policy must: 1) adequately
address the concerns and win the support of all the major interested parties,
and 2) adopt a conservative technical and institutional approachone
that places high priority on avoiding the problems that have repeatedly
beset the program in the past. While this may require a more extensive
program than now contemplated, the extra costs could be viewed as insurance
against the potentially higher costs of failure to satisfactorily resolve
the high-level radioactive waste problem.