This design calculation updates the previous criticality evaluation for the fuel handling, transfer, and staging operations to be performed in the Dry Transfer Facility (DTF) including the remediation area. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that operations performed in the DTF and RF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in Project Requirements Document (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p.

The purpose of this calculation is to apply the process described in the TDR-DS0-NU-000001 Rev. 02, Preclosure Criticality Analysis Process Report (Ref. 2.2.25) to aid in establishing design and operational criteria important to criticality safety and to identify potential control parameters and their limits important to the criticality safety of commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) handling operations in the Wet Handling Facility (WHF)

The means to prevent and control criticality must be addressed as part of the Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA) required for compliance with 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 180319], where the preclosure period covers the time prior to permanent closure activities. This technical report presents the nuclear criticality safety evaluation that documents the achievement of this objective.

The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of Department of Energy (DOE) standardized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) canisters.

The purpose of this calculation is to apply the process described in the Preclosure Criticality Analysis Process Report (Ref. 2.2.12) to establish the bias for keff calculations performed for commercial nuclear fuels using the MCNP code system. This bias will be used in criticality safety analyses as part of the basis for establishing the upper subcritical limit (USL). This calculation also defines the range of applicability (ROA) for which the bias may be used directly without need to consider additional penalties on the USL.

As part of the plutonium waste form development and down-select process, repository analyses have been conducted to evaluate the long-term performance of these forms for repository acceptance. Intact and degraded mode criticality analysis of mixed oxide (MOX) spent fuel is presented in Volume I, while Volume II presents the evaluations of the waste form containing plutonium immobilized in a ceramic matrix.

The objective of this calculation is to perform intact and degraded mode criticality evaluations of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) placed in the DOE standardized SNF canister. This analysis evaluates the codisposal of the DOE SNF canister containing the ATR SNF in a 5-Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Short Waste Package (WP) (Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC [BSC] 2004a), which is to be placed in a monitored geologic repository (MGR).

The objective of this calculation is to characterize the nuclear criticality safety concerns associated with the codisposal of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Shippingport Light Water Breeder Reactor (SP LWBR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in a 5-Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Waste Package (WP), which is to be placed in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR).