The Monitored Geologic Repository Waste Package Operations of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management & Operating Contractor (CRWMS M&O) performed calculations to provide input for disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor (Ref. 1). The TRIGA SNF has been considered for disposal at the potential Yucca Mountain site.
The objective of this calculation is to evaluate the criticality potential for co-disposal waste packages affected by an igneous intrusion disruptive event in the emplacement drifts. The scope of this calculation is limited to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) types in DOE standardized SNF canisters or Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Canisters.
The purpose of this activity is to develop a representative “limiting” axial burnup profile for pressurized water reactors (PWRs), which would encompass the isotopic axial variations caused by different assembly irradiation histories, and produce conservative isotopics with respect to criticality. The effect that the low burnup regions near the ends of spent fuel have on system reactivity is termed the “end-effect”. This calculation will quantify the end-effects associated with Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies emplaced in a hypothetical 21 PWR waste package.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of Department of Energy (DOE) standardized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) canisters. It is intended that the results of the criticality safety calculations provided in this document will
This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development (WPD) department with the objective of providing a comprehensive, conservative estimate of the consequences of the criticality which could possibly occur as the result of commercial spent nuclear fuel emplaced in the underground repository at Yucca Mountain. The consequences of criticality are measured principally in terms of the resulting changes in radionuclide inventory as a function of the power level and duration of the criticality.
The objective of this calculation is to perform additional degraded mode criticality evaluations of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) codisposed in a 5-Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Waste Package (WP). The scope of this calculation is limited to the most reactive degraded configurations of the codisposal WP with an almost intact Ident-69 container (breached and flooded but otherwise non-degraded) containing intact FFTF SNF pins.
The purpose ofthis engineering calculation is to estimate the frequency of misloading spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies that would result in exceeding the criticality design basis of a waste package (WP). This type of misload - a reactivity misload - results from the incorrect placement of one or more fuel assemblies into a waste package such that the criticality controls do not match the required controls for the fuel assemblies.
The criticality consequence analysis for pressurized water reactor (PWR) waste packages (WP) (Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System [CRWMS] Management and Operating Contractor [M&O] 1997) focused on results obtained by maximizing postulated rates of reactivity insertion to assure no synergistic reactions could occur among waste packages from hypothetical criticality events. Other variables potentially influencing the criticality consequences were held constant during the above referenced analysis.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform degraded mode criticality evaluations of plutonium disposed in a ceramic waste form and emplaced in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). A 5 Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Canister Waste Package (WP) design, incorporating the can-in-canister concept for plutonium immobilization is considered for this calculation. Each HLW glass pour canister contains 7 tubes. Each tube contains 4 cans, with 20 ceramic disks (immobilized plutonium) in each.
