This “Technical Evaluation Report on the Content of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain License Application; Postclosure Volume: Repository Safety After Permanent Closure” (TER Postclosure Volume) presents information on the NRC staff’s review of DOE’s Safety Analysis Report (SAR), provided on June 3, 2008, as updated by DOE on February 19, 2009. The NRC staff also reviewed information DOE provided in response to NRC staff’s requests for additional information and other information that DOE provided related to the SAR.

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

NRC/NEI, January 24, 2014 Public Meeting Presentations

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

NRC Waste Confidence Rulemaking, Federal Register, 1984, 1990, 1999, and 2008

In the existing U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations governing the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, the time period of compliance was set at 10,000 years. Recently, a Court ordered that EPA and NRC either revise the regulation on this topic to be "based upon and consistent with" recommendations made by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences, who recommended a time period of compliance out to as long as one million years, or seek congressional relief.

The Commission is charged with submitting a
draft report to the Secretary of Energy before
the end of July 2011. To aid the Commissioners
in fulfilling that responsibility, the Commission
staff has prepared this report to summarize what
the Commission has heard up to this point in
the process. It does not attempt to recount every
comment or opinion submitted to the Commission
thus far; rather, the aim here is to summarize
major themes from the extensive testimony and
public comment the Commission has received to

This paper provides a brief description of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its regulatory process for the current nuclear fuel cycle for light water power reactors (LWRs). It focuses on the regulatory framework for the licensing of facilities in the fuel cycle. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the NRC and its regulatory program including a description of its organization, function, authority, and responsibilities.

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

On the historic evidence, but also for the distinctive qualities of the challenge, nuclear waste siting conflicts are assuredly among the most refractory in the large variety of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) facility siting disputes. Since the president brought the Yucca Mountain process to a halt in 2010 (or, more accurately, issued its death certificate), the search for a permanent waste fuel repository is at the starting line again.

The voluntary siting process for the Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility set forth in the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA) of 1987 provides a potential host community a unique opportunity to improve its present situation and to gain greater control over its future.

These slides were presented by Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) to the NRC at the June 16, 2015 pre-application public meeting at the NRC offices in Rockville, Maryland.

This Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) provides guidance to the staff for determining if
storage systems to be licensed under 10 CFR Part 72 allow ready retrieval of spent fuel.
This guidance is not a regulation or a requirement.

This Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) provides guidance to the staff on classifying spent nuclear
fuel as either (1) damaged, (2) undamaged, or (3) intact, before interim storage or
transportation. This is not a regulation or requirement and can be modified or superseded by
an applicant with supportable technical arguments.

Revision 2

Compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(l) has been interpreted to mean that a licensee, during any
point in the storage cycle, must have a means of retrieving and repackaging individual fuel
assemblies even after an accident. The staff has reevaluated this interpretation.

The closure weld for the outer cover plate for austenitic stainless steel designs may be
inspected using either volumetric or multiple pass dye penetrant techniques subject to the
following conditions:
• Dye penetrant (PT) examination may only be used in lieu of volumetric
examination only on austenitic stainless steels. PT examination should be done
in accordance with ASME Section V, Article 6, “Liquid Penetrant Examination.”
• For either ultrasonic examination (UT) or PT examination, the minimum

Several changes have occurred since the issuance of NUREG-1536, “Standard Review Plan
(SRP) for Dry Cask Storage Systems,” that affect the staff’s approach to confinement
evaluation. The attachment to this ISG integrates the current staff approach into a revision of
ISG-5. The highlights of the changes include:
• Reflects October 1998 revisions to 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106.
• Expands and clarifies acceptance criteria associated with confinement analysis and
acceptance of “leak tight” testing instead of detailed confinement analysis.

The Standard Review Plan, NUREG-1536, Chapter 5, Section V, 2 recommends that “the
applicant calculate the source term on the basis of the fuel that will actually provide the
bounding source term,” and states that the applicant should, “either specify the minimum initial
enrichment or establish the specific source terms as operating controls and limits for cask use.”
A specified source term is difficult for most cask users to determine and for inspectors to verify.

Staff raised two major issues concerning the adverse effects of fission gases to the gas-mixture
thermal conductivity in a spent fuel canister in a post accident environment. The two major
concerns were: (1) the reduction of the thermal conductivity of the canister gas by the mixing of
fission gases expelled from failed fuel pins and (2) the resultant temperature and pressure rise
within the canister. Since the fission gas is typically of a lower conductivity than the cover gas,