Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

There are more than 250 forms of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)­owned spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Due to the variety of the spent nuclear fuel, the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) has designated nine representative fuel groups for disposal criticality analyses based on fuel matrix, primary fissile isotope, and enrichment. For each fuel group, a fuel type that represents the characteristics of all fuels in that group has been selected for detailed analysis.

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for all spent fuels and high-level wastes (HLW) that will eventually be disposed of in a geologic repository. The purpose of this document, and the information contained in the associated computerized data bases and supporting technical reports, is to provide the technical characteristics of the radioactive waste materials that will (or may) be accepted by DOE for interim storage in an MRS or emplacement in a repository as developed under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendment of 1987.

The main question before the Transportation and Storage Subcommittee was whether the United States
should change its approach to storing and transporting spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level
radioactive waste (HLW) while one or more permanent disposal facilities are established.
To answer this question and to develop specific recommendations and options for consideration by the
full Commission, the Subcommittee held multiple meetings and deliberative sessions, visited several

The Disposal Subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) addressed a wide-ranging set of issues, all bearing directly on the central question: “How can the United States go about establishing one or more disposal sites for high-level nuclear wastes in a manner and within a timeframe that is technically, socially, economically, and politically acceptable?”

This analysis provides information necessary for total system performance assessment (TSPA) for the license application (LA) to include the excess U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) spent nuclear fuel and lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass. This information includes the additional radionuclide inventory due to MOX spent nuclear fuel and LaBS glass and the analysis that shows that the TSPA models for commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) and high-level waste (HLW) degradation are appropriate for MOX spent nuclear fuel and LaBS glass, respectively.

After more than 20 years of commercial nuclear power, the Federal Government has yet to develop a broadly supported policy for fulfilling its legal responsibility for the final isolation of high-level radioactive waste. OTA's study concludes that until such a policy is adopted in law, there is a substantial risk that the false starts, shifts of policy, and fluctuating support that have plagued the final isolation program in the past will continue.

The purpose of this report, and the information contained in the associated computerized data bases, is to establish the DOE/OCRWM reference characteristics of the radioactive waste materials that may be accepted by DOE for emplacement in the mined geologic disposal system as developed under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. This report provides relevant technical data for use by DOE and its supporting contractors and is not intended to be a policy document.

An Account of the Programs of Federal Agencies and Events That Have Led to the Selection of a Potential Site for a Geologic Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste

How to dispose of highly radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants is a question that has remained unresolved in the face rapidly changing technological, economic, and political requirements. In the three decades following WWII, two federal agencies -- the Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration -- tried unsuccessfully to develop a satisfactory plan for managing high level wastes.

The effective termination of the Yucca Mountain program by the U.S. Administration in 2009
has further delayed the construction and operation of a permanent disposal facility for used fuel
and high level radioactive waste (HLW) in the United States. In concert with this decision, the
President directed the Energy Secretary to establish the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s
Nuclear Future to review and provide recommendations on options for managing used fuel and

How to dispose of highly radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants is a question that has remained unresolved in the face of rapidly changing technological, economic, and political requirements. In the three decades following World War II, two federal agencies--the Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration--tried unsuccessfully to develop a satisfactory plan for managing high level wastes.

With the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), Congress for the first time established in law a comprehensive Federal policy for commercial high-level radioactive waste management, including interim storage and permanent disposal. NWPA provides sufficient authority for
developing and operating a high-level radioactive waste management system based on disposal in mined geologic repositories. Authorization

To organize its investigation of whether changes are needed in the nation’s current approach to storing and eventually transporting spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW), the Subcommittee began by asking a series of related questions:
• What role should storage play in an integrated U.S. waste management system and strategy in the future?

This report puts forth a number of options and recommendations for how to engage
stakeholders and other members of the public in the storage and management of spent
nuclear fuel and high level waste in the United States. The options are generated from a
scientific review of existing publications proposing criteria for assessing past efforts to
engage publics and stakeholders in decision-making about risky technologies. A set of
nine principles are derived for evaluating cases of public and stakeholder engagement with