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Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility Design Criteria Policy Document - 2nd Draft
Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility Design Criteria Policy Document - 2nd Draft
Nuclear Criticality Calculations for Canister-Based Facilities - DOE SNF
Nuclear Criticality Calculations for Canister-Based Facilities - DOE SNF
The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of Department of Energy (DOE) standardized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) canisters.
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Specific Safety Guide)
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Specific Safety Guide)
This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on the storage of spent nuclear fuel. It covers all types of storage facilities and all types of spent fuel from nuclear power plants and research reactors. It takes into consideration the longer storage periods that have become necessary owing to delays in the development of disposal facilities and the decrease in reprocessing activities. It also considers developments associated with nuclear fuel, such as higher enrichment, mixed oxide fuels and higher burnup.
Radionuclide Screening
Radionuclide Screening
The waste forms under consideration for disposal in the repository at Yucca Mountain contain scores of radionuclides. It would be impractical and highly inefficient to model all of these radionuclides in a total system performance assessment (TSPA). Thus, the purpose of this radionuclide screening analysis is to remove from further consideration (screen out) radionuclides that are unlikely to significantly contribute to radiation dose to the public from a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain.
Preclosure Consequence Analyses
Preclosure Consequence Analyses
The purpose of this calculation is to demonstrate that the preclosure performance objectives specified in 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) (Reference 2.2.1) have been met for the proposed design and operations in the geologic repository operations area (GROA) during normal operations and Category 1 event sequences, and following Category 2 event sequences. Category 1 event sequences are those natural and human-induced event sequences that are expected to occur one or more times before permanent closure of the repository.
Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations
Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations
This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004 (DIRS 167614).
Nuclear Criticality Calculations for Canister-Based Facilities - Commercial SNF
Nuclear Criticality Calculations for Canister-Based Facilities - Commercial SNF
The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of the transportation, aging and disposal (TAD) canister-based systems.
Treatment and final disposal of nuclear waste: Programme for encapsulation, deep geological disposal, and research, development and demonstration: Ch 6 - App 1
Treatment and final disposal of nuclear waste: Programme for encapsulation, deep geological disposal, and research, development and demonstration: Ch 6 - App 1
In RD&D-Programme 92, SKB presented a partially new strategy for its activities. The new strategy entailed a focusing and concentration on the implementation of deep disposal of a limited quantity (about 800 tonnes) of encapsulated spent nuclear fuel during the coming 20-year period. Following this initial deposition, the results of the work will be evaluated, and only then will a decision be taken as to how and when regular deposition of the main body of the fuel and other long-lived nuclear waste will take place.
Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada (40 CFR Part 197) -- Final Rule Response to Comments Document
Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada (40 CFR Part 197) -- Final Rule Response to Comments Document
EPA held a 90-day public comment period for the proposed radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain (August 27, 1999 through November 26, 1999). Sixty-nine (69) sets of written comments were submitted to EPAÕs Air Docket regarding the proposed standards, although some commenters submitted more than one set of written comments. In addition, the Agency received oral testimony on the proposed standards from 28 speakers during public hearings that were held in Washington, DC; Las Vegas, NV; Amargosa Valley, NV; and Kansas City, MO.
Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Final Rule
Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Final Rule
We, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are promulgating public health and safety standards for radioactive material stored or disposed of in the potential repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EnPA, Pub. L. 102Ð486) directs us to develop these standards. Section 801 of the EnPA also requires us to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study to provide findings and recommendations on reasonable standards for protection of the public health and safety.
Expert Judgement in Performance Assessment
Expert Judgement in Performance Assessment
Proposals to site, construct and operate a radioactive waste disposal facility in Sweden will be supported by performance assessments (PAs). Such PAs will require a range of expert judgements to be made. As part of SKI’s preparation for reviewing SKB’s Pas and for conducting independent PAs, SKI has identified a need for further research on the treatment of expert judgement in PA.
Demonstration and Dialogue: Mediation in Swedish Nuclear Waste Management
Demonstration and Dialogue: Mediation in Swedish Nuclear Waste Management
This report analyses mediation and mediators in Swedish nuclear waste management. Mediation is about establishing agreement and building common knowledge. It is argued that demonstrations and dialogue are the two prominent approaches to mediation in Swedish nuclear waste management. Mediation through demonstration is about showing, displaying, and pointing out a path to safe disposal for inspection. It implies a strict division between demonstrator and audience.
Handling and final disposal of nuclear waste: Siting of a deep repository
Handling and final disposal of nuclear waste: Siting of a deep repository
The siting of the facilities for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other long-lived<br/>nuclear waste is one of the central remaining tasks within the Swedish waste programme.<br/>Work relating to the siting of the repository is being conducted in stages and will<br/>continue for most of the 1990:ies. This report describes the background to, the goals<br/>for and structure of SKB 's activities relating to the siting of a deep geological<br/>repository.
Final 40 CFR 19: Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes
Final 40 CFR 19: Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes
Final 40 CFR 40 Ruling on Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel , High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes
Handling and final disposal of nuclear waste. September 1989
Handling and final disposal of nuclear waste. September 1989
For those parts of the waste system that have already been taken into operation - transportation and handling systems, central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB) and final repository for reactor waste (SFR)- the research and development stage has already largely been passed. The programme presented here therefore pertains primarily to the treatment and final disposal of spent fuel and the decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
Handling and final disposal of nuclear waste. September 1986
Handling and final disposal of nuclear waste. September 1986
The Act on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:3) obligates the owners of the Swedish nuclear power plants to<br/>jointly prepare a comprehensive programme for the research and development work and other measures<br/>required for the safe management and disposal of the waste from nuclear power.<br/>For those parts of the waste system that have already been taken into operation or are under construction - transportation and handling systems, central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB) and final repository for reactor waste (SFR) - the research and development st
Treatment and final disposal of nuclear waste: Programme for encapsulation, deep geological disposal, and research, development and demonstration: Ch 1 - 5
Treatment and final disposal of nuclear waste: Programme for encapsulation, deep geological disposal, and research, development and demonstration: Ch 1 - 5
In RD&D-Programme 92, SKB presented a partially new strategy for its activities. The new strategy entailed a focusing and concentration on the implementation of deep disposal of a limited quantity (about 800 tonnes) of encapsulated spent nuclear fuel during the coming 20-year period. Following this initial deposition, the results of the work will be evaluated, and only then will a decision be taken as to how and when regular deposition of the main body of the fuel and other long-lived nuclear waste will take place.
Site selection - Siting of the Final Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel
Site selection - Siting of the Final Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel
SKB has selected Forsmark as the site for the final repository for spent nuclear fuel. The site selection<br/>is the end result of an extensive siting process that began in the early 1990s. The strategy and<br/>plan for the work was based on experience from investigations and development work over a period<br/>of more than ten years prior to then.<br/>This document describes the siting work and SKB’s choice of site for the final repository.
From Risk Analysis to the Safety Case. Values in Risk Assessments
From Risk Analysis to the Safety Case. Values in Risk Assessments
The foundation for work related to nuclear waste management is laid by laws and outlines e.g. the responsibilities of the reactor owners and the state, as represented by the authorities. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), as well as Posiva Oy in Finland, were set up by the reactor owners in the respective countries in response to the responsibilities of planning, conducting research and to implement the physical structures leading to a safe management of nuclear wastes.
Structure for Transparency in Nuclear Waste Management
Structure for Transparency in Nuclear Waste Management
The purpose of this report is a comparison of the structures for nuclear waste management in France, Sweden and UK. The source materials for this comparison are studies carried out in each of these countries by Syncho Ltd. over the past 5 years. The Swedish structural review was sponsored by SKI and SSI, and carried out as a pilot study during the years 1996 and 1997 (Espejo & Gill, 1998) as part of the RISCOM I project.