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Probabilistic External Criticality Evaluation (SCPB: N/A)
Probabilistic External Criticality Evaluation (SCPB: N/A)
This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development (WPD) department to provide a probabilistic evaluation of the potential for criticality of fissile material which has been transported from a geologic repository containing breached waste packages of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This analysis is part of a continuing investigation of the probability of criticality resulting from the emplacement of spent nuclear fuel in a geologic repository.
Geochemistry Model Validation Report: External Accumulation Model
Geochemistry Model Validation Report: External Accumulation Model
The purpose of this report is to document and validate the external accumulation model that predicts accumulation of fissile materials in the invert, fractures and lithophysae in the rock beneath a degrading waste package containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. (Lithophysae are hollow, bubblelike structures in the rock composed of concentric shells of finely crystalline alkali feldspar, quartz, and other materials (Bates and Jackson 1984 [DIRS 128109], p.
EQ6 Calculations for Chemical Degradation of Pu-Ceramic Waste Packages
EQ6 Calculations for Chemical Degradation of Pu-Ceramic Waste Packages
In this study, the long-term geochemical behavior of waste package (WP), containing Pu-ceramic, was modeled. The ceramic under consideration contains Ti, U, Pu, Gd and Hf in a pyrochlore structure; the Gd and Hf stabilize the mineral structure, but are also intended to provide criticality control. The specific study objectives were to determine:
1) the extent to which criticality control material, suggested for this WP design, will remain in the WP after corrosion/dissolution of the initial package configuration (such that it can be effective in preventing criticality), and
Analysis of Critical Benchmark Experiments for Configurations External to WP
Analysis of Critical Benchmark Experiments for Configurations External to WP
The Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (Reference 1) states that the accuracy of the criticality analysis methodology (MCNP Monte Carlo code and cross-section data) designated to assess the potential for criticality of various configurations in the Yucca Mountain proposed repository is established by evaluating appropriately selected benchmark critical experiments.
Preliminary Criticality Analysis of Degraded SNF Accumulations External to a Waste Package (SCPB: N/A)
Preliminary Criticality Analysis of Degraded SNF Accumulations External to a Waste Package (SCPB: N/A)
This study is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MODS) Waste Package Development Department (WPDD) to provide input to a separate evaluation on the probablility of criticality in the far- field environment. These calculations are performed in sufficient detail to provide conservatively bounding configurations to support separate probabilistic analyses.
Report On External Criticality of Plutonium Waste Forms In A Geologic Repository
Report On External Criticality of Plutonium Waste Forms In A Geologic Repository
This report presents the analyses and results for the potential occurrence of external criticality events which could result from plutonium waste forms emplaced in a geologic repository similar to the one being developed at Yucca Mountain. The analyses evaluate both the MOX spent fuel and the immobilized plutonium waste forms in a repository if the waste package has degraded and if the fissile material has migrated to the invert and out into the far-field.
OECD/NEA: Belgium
OECD/NEA: Belgium
Second Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Kingdom of Belgium National Report
Second Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Kingdom of Belgium National Report
On 8 December 1997 Belgium has signed the Joint Convention. The Belgian legislator has expressed its consent with the obligations resulting from the Convention via the Law of 2 August 2002. The ratification was obtained on 5 September 2002. The Convention became effective on 4 December 2002, or 90 days after the Ratification Act had been deposited. Belgium belongs to the group of Contracting Parties having at least one operational nuclear generating unit on their territory.
Kingdom of Belgium, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Second Review Meeting (May 2006), Answers to the Questions of Contracting Parties on the National Report submitted by Belgium
Kingdom of Belgium, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Second Review Meeting (May 2006), Answers to the Questions of Contracting Parties on the National Report submitted by Belgium
Kingdom of Belgium, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Second Review Meeting (May 2006), Answers to the Questions of Contracting Parties on the National Report submitted by Belgium
Kingdom of Belgium Fourth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management National Report
Kingdom of Belgium Fourth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management National Report
On 8 December 1997 Belgium signed the Joint Convention. The Belgian legislator has expressed its consent with the obligations resulting from the Convention by the Law of 2 August 2002. The ratification followed on 5 September 2002. The Convention became effective on 4 December 2002, i.e. 90 days following ratification. Belgium belongs to the group of Contracting Parties having at least one operational nuclear power plant on their territory.
Technical overview of the SAFIR 2 report: Safety Assessment and Feasibility Interim Report 2
Technical overview of the SAFIR 2 report: Safety Assessment and Feasibility Interim Report 2
This document is the technical overview of the SAFIR 2 report that synthesises all of the technical and scientific knowledge available at the end of the second phase (1990–2000) of the ONDRAF/NIRAS programme of methodological research and development on the final disposal of category B and C waste in a poorly-indurated clay formation. The SAFIR 2 report will be handed over by ONDRAF/NIRAS to its supervisory Minister at the beginning of 2002, after publication approval by its Board of Directors.
Identifying remaining socio-technical challenges at the national level: Belgium
Identifying remaining socio-technical challenges at the national level: Belgium
This report is part of the research project International Socio-Technical Challenges for Implementing Geological Disposal: InSOTEC (see www.insotec.eu), funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme.<br/>This report is a contribution to Work Package 1 of the project, which aims to identify the most significant socio-technical challenges related to geological disposal of radioactive waste. To achieve this objective, a comparative analysis of 14 national programmes will be performed.