DOE Yucca Implementation Letter
DOE Yucca Implementation Letter
Letter from the Congress of the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Letter from the Congress of the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report describes a methodology for performing postclosure criticality analyses within the repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. An important component of the postclosure criticality analysis is the calculation of conservative isotopic concentrations for spent nuclear fuel. This report documents the isotopic calculation methodology. The isotopic calculation methodology is shown to be conservative based upon current data for pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor spent nuclear fuel.
The criticality consequence analysis for pressurized water reactor (PWR) waste packages (WP) (Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System [CRWMS] Management and Operating Contractor [M&O] 1997) focused on results obtained by maximizing postulated rates of reactivity insertion to assure no synergistic reactions could occur among waste packages from hypothetical criticality events. Other variables potentially influencing the criticality consequences were held constant during the above referenced analysis.
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is one of the most common corrosion-related causes for premature breach of metal structural components. SCC is the initiation and propagation of cracks in structural components due to three factors that must be present simultaneously (Jones 1992 [DIRS 169906], Section 8.1): metallurgical susceptibility, critical environment, and sustained tensile stresses.
This study provides results supporting the conclusion that the repository can be operated over a varying range of thermal modes and therefore temperatures. In particular, this work focused on limiting the peak, postclosure waste package surface temperature to less than 85 degrees Celsius, a possible limit due to corrosion considerations. These operating modes were compared by varying the waste package in drift spacing (0.1-2.83 meters), drift pitch (drift spacing centerline to centerline of 40-120 meters), ventilation duration (75-300 years), and ventilation efficiency (50-80%).
The purpose of this calculation is to determine the structural response of the Transportation, Aging, Disposal (TAD) waste package (WP) and the 5-Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste/Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel Short (5-DHLW/DOE SNF Short) co-disposal WP with emplacement pallet (EP) at room temperature and elevated temperatures for the complete drift collapse event sequence. the repository emplacement drift (RED) collapse will impose a pressure load due to the weight of the rubble rock and thermal expansion due to temperature rise as a result of lack of ventilation.
An Account of the Programs of Federal Agencies and Events That Have Led to the Selection of a Potential Site for a Geologic Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste
The purpose of this scientific analysis report, Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Igneous Scenario Criticality Evaluation, is to investigate the effects of an igneous intrusion event occurring in the repository on commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) stored in waste packages. This activity supports the Postclosure Criticality Department's development of bounding (design-basis) configurations for loading specifications and the evaluation of features, events, and processes (FEPs) that could lead to waste package criticality.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform intact mode and partially degraded mode criticality evaluations of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Enrico Fermi (EF) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) co-disposed in a 5 Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Waste Package (WP) and emplaced in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). The criticality evaluations estimate the values of the effective neutron multiplication factor, keff, as a measure of nuclear criticality potential, for the 5- DHLW/DOE SNF WP with intact or partially degraded internal configurations.
This report presents the analysis and conclusions with respect to disposal criticality for canisters containing aluminum-based fuels from research reactors. The analysis has been divided into three phases. Phase I, dealt with breached and flooded waste packages containing relatively intact canisters and intact internal (basket) structures; Phase II, the subject of this report, covers the degradation of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and structures internal to the codisposal waste package including high level waste (HLW), canisters, and criticality control material.
The first objective of this calculation is the identification of the degraded configurations of the Enhanced Design Alternatives (EDA) II design that have some possibility of criticality and that can occur within 10,000 years of placement in the repository. The next objective is to evaluate the criticality of these configurations and to estimate the probability of occurrence for those configurations that could support criticality.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of the transportation, aging and disposal (TAD) canister-based systems.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform an example criticality evaluation for degraded internal configurations of a boiling water reactor (BWR) waste package (WP) containing 44 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies. The BWR assembly design considered is based on the General Electric (GE) 8x8 assembly (see section 5.1). Depletion analyses for various assembly average enrichment and burnup (expressed as gigawatt days/metric ton Uranium; GWd/MTU) combinations are performed using the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S sequence of SCALE 4.3 (CSCI:30011-2002; Ref. 7.5).
This design calculation is a revision of the previous criticality evaluation of the operations and
processes that are performed in the Aging Facility. It will also demonstrate and assure that the
storage and aging operations to be performed in the Aging Facility meet the criticality safety
design criteria in the Project Design Criteria Document (BSC 2005i, Section 4.9.2.2), and the
nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the SNF Aging System Description Document
The purpose of this methods report is to document: (1) the origin, and the methods used in the development of a comprehensive list of features, events, and/or processes (FEPs) that could potentially affect the postclosure performance of the Yucca Mountain disposal system; (2) the methodology and guidance used to screen FEPs for inclusion or exclusion from Total System Performance Assessment for the License Application (TSPA-LA) analysis; (3) the methodology and guidance used to create scenario classes; and (4) compliance with NUREG-1804 (NRC 2003.
The means to prevent and control criticality must be addressed as part of the Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA) required for compliance with 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 180319], where the preclosure period covers the time prior to permanent closure activities. This technical report presents the nuclear criticality safety evaluation that documents the achievement of this objective.
The objective of this calculation is to characterize the criticality aspect of a Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE SNF) canister containing 5 Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) assemblies in a Five-Pack Defense High-Level Waste (HLW) waste package(WP). The purpose of this calculation is to investigate the criticality issues for the WP containg HLW and DOE SNF canisters in various stages of degradation. The calculational method used to perform the criticality calculations consisted of using the MNCP Version 4B2 (Ref.
This report presents a two-phased approach to develop and analyze a “thermal envelope” to represent the postclosure response of the repository to the anticipated range of repository design thermal loadings. In Phase 1 an estimated limiting waste stream (ELWS) is identified and analyzed to determine the extremes of average and local thermal loading conditions. The coldest thermal loading condition is represented by an emplacement drift loaded exclusively with high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and/or defense spent nuclear fuel (DSNF).
The objective of this calculation is to characterize the criticality aspect of a Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE SNF) canister containing 5 Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) assemblies in a Five-Pack defense High-Level Waste (HLW) waste package. The purpose of this calculation is to investigate the criticality issues for the waste package (WP) containing HLW and DOE SNF canisters in various stages of degradation.
The objective of this calculation is to perform intact and degraded mode criticality evaluations of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) placed in the DOE standardized SNF canister. This analysis evaluates the codisposal of the DOE SNF canister containing the ATR SNF in a 5-Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Short Waste Package (WP) (Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC [BSC] 2004a), which is to be placed in a monitored geologic repository (MGR).
The purpose of this calculation is to estimate the probability of misloading a commercial spent
nuclear fuel waste package with a fuel assembly(s) that has a reactivity (i.e., enrichment and/or
burnup) outside the waste package design. The waste package designs are based on the expected
commercial spent nuclear fuel assemblies and previous analyses (Macheret, P. 2001, Section 4.1
and Table 1). For this calculation, a misloaded waste package is defined as a waste package that
The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of the transportation, aging and disposal (TAD) canister-based systems.
This report is developed from Technical Work Plan for: Thermodynamic Databases for Chemical Modeling (BSC 2006 [DIRS 177885]). The purpose of this analysis report is to update the thermochemical database data0.ymp.R4 (Output DTN: SN0410T0510404.002). Various data have been added, corrected, or corroborated, partly in response to four Condition Reports (CRs): CR 6489, CR 6731, CR 7542, and CR 7756. The most notable changes are a general revision of phosphate data to achieve consistency with the recommendations from the Committee on Data for Science and Technology (CODATA) (Cox. et al.
The purpose of this calculation is to determine the required minimum burnup as a function of initial pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly enrichment that would permit loading of fuel into the 21 PWR waste package (WP), as provided for in QAP-2-0 Activity Evaluation, Perform Criticality, Thermal, Structural, & Shielding Analyses (Reference 7.1).