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Spent Fuel Project Office, ISG-8 - Limited Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transport and Storage Casks
Spent Fuel Project Office, ISG-8 - Limited Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transport and Storage Casks
Spent Fuel Project Office Interim Staff Guidance - 8
Spent Fuel Project Office, Interim Staff Guidance - 8, Revision 1, Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transport and Storage Casks
Spent Fuel Project Office, Interim Staff Guidance - 8, Revision 1, Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transport and Storage Casks
Spent Fuel Project Office, Interim Staff Guidance - 8, Revision 1
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT SECOND NATIONAL REPORT
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT SECOND NATIONAL REPORT
This report describes the actions taken in Argentina on the safety of spent fuel management
(SF) and on the safety of radioactive waste management, in order to provide evidence of the
fulfillment of its obligations under the Joint Convention. To facilitate the reading and a better
understanding of this report a summary of those parts of the 1st Report that were considered
necessary have been included.
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT THIRD NATIONAL REPORT
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT THIRD NATIONAL REPORT
The present National Report describes the actions taken in Argentina on the safety of spent fuel
(SF) management and on the safety of radioactive waste (RW) management, in order to provide
evidence of the fulfilment of the obligations derived from the Joint Convention. To facilitate the
reading and a better understanding, it has been decided to include a summary of those parts of
the two prior National Reports that are considered necessary in order to comply with this
objective.
Dry Cask Storage of Nuclear Spent Fuel
Dry Cask Storage of Nuclear Spent Fuel
Cost Estimate for an Away-From-Reactor Generic Interim Storage Facility (GISF) for Spent Nuclear Fuel
Cost Estimate for an Away-From-Reactor Generic Interim Storage Facility (GISF) for Spent Nuclear Fuel
As nuclear power plants began to run out of storage capacity in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage pools, many nuclear operating companies added higher density pool storage racks to increase pool capacity. Most nuclear power plant storage pools have been re-racked one or more times. As many spent fuel storage pools were re-racked to the maximum extent possible, nuclear operating companies began to employ interim dry storage technologies to store SNF in certified casks and canister-based systems outside of the storage pool in independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs).
Technical Bases for Extended Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Technical Bases for Extended Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) are currently licensed for 20 years. However, delays in developing permanent spent fuel disposal capability require continued ISFSI storage beyond the 20-year term. This report provides a technical basis for demonstrating the feasibility of extended spent fuel storage in ISFSIs.
Spent Fuel Project Office, Interim Staff Guidance - 8, Revision 2, Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transport and Storage Casks
Spent Fuel Project Office, Interim Staff Guidance - 8, Revision 2, Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transport and Storage Casks
Spent Fuel Project Office, Interim Staff Guidance - 8, Revision 2 - Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transport
and Storage Casks
slides - ISFSI Pad Design Issues
slides - ISFSI Pad Design Issues
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
slides - ISFSI Security Rulemaking Update
slides - ISFSI Security Rulemaking Update
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
slides - ISFSI Security Rulemaking Update
slides - ISFSI Security Rulemaking Update
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
Yankee Atomic Electric Company vs The United States, November 14, 2013
Yankee Atomic Electric Company vs The United States, November 14, 2013
Spent Nuclear Fuel Litigation - Court of Federal Claims decision in Maine Yankee II, Conn Yankee II and Yankee Atomic II
slides - Prairie Island ISFSI License Renewal and High Burn Up Fuel Contention
slides - Prairie Island ISFSI License Renewal and High Burn Up Fuel Contention
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
THERMAL PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY STUDIES IN SUPPORT OF MATERIAL MODELING FOR EXTENDED STORAGE OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL
THERMAL PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY STUDIES IN SUPPORT OF MATERIAL MODELING FOR EXTENDED STORAGE OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL
The work reported here is an investigation of the sensitivity of component temperatures in a specific storage system, including fuel cladding temperatures, in response to modeling assumptions that differ from design-basis, including age-related changes that could degrade the thermal behavior of the system. Preliminary evaluations of representative horizontal and vertical storage systems at design basis conditions provides general insight into the expected behavior of storage systems over extended periods of time.
DECOMMISSIONING COST ANALYSIS for the CLINTON POWER STATION
DECOMMISSIONING COST ANALYSIS for the CLINTON POWER STATION
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Crystal River Unit 3 -- UPDATED IRRADIATED FUEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM- 10 CFR 50.54(bb) and SITE-SPECIFIC DECOMMISSIONING COST ESTIMATE FOR THE CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Crystal River Unit 3 -- UPDATED IRRADIATED FUEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM- 10 CFR 50.54(bb) and SITE-SPECIFIC DECOMMISSIONING COST ESTIMATE FOR THE CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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Kewaunee Power Station -- Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
Kewaunee Power Station -- Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
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ORDER GRANTING APPLICATIONS TO REDUCE RATES UNDER WHOLESALE POWER CONTRACTS
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATIONS TO REDUCE RATES UNDER WHOLESALE POWER CONTRACTS
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NRC SFST ISG-2: Fuel Retrievability
NRC SFST ISG-2: Fuel Retrievability
This Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) provides guidance to the staff for determining if
storage systems to be licensed under 10 CFR Part 72 allow ready retrieval of spent fuel.
This guidance is not a regulation or a requirement.
NRC ISG-1: Classifying the Condition of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Interim Storage and Transportation Based on Function
NRC ISG-1: Classifying the Condition of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Interim Storage and Transportation Based on Function
This Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) provides guidance to the staff on classifying spent nuclear
fuel as either (1) damaged, (2) undamaged, or (3) intact, before interim storage or
transportation. This is not a regulation or requirement and can be modified or superseded by
an applicant with supportable technical arguments.
Revision 2
NRC SFST ISG-4: Cask Closure Weld Inspections
NRC SFST ISG-4: Cask Closure Weld Inspections
The closure weld for the outer cover plate for austenitic stainless steel designs may be
inspected using either volumetric or multiple pass dye penetrant techniques subject to the
following conditions:
• Dye penetrant (PT) examination may only be used in lieu of volumetric
examination only on austenitic stainless steels. PT examination should be done
in accordance with ASME Section V, Article 6, “Liquid Penetrant Examination.”
• For either ultrasonic examination (UT) or PT examination, the minimum
NRC SFST ISG-5: Confinement Evaluation
NRC SFST ISG-5: Confinement Evaluation
Several changes have occurred since the issuance of NUREG-1536, “Standard Review Plan
(SRP) for Dry Cask Storage Systems,” that affect the staff’s approach to confinement
evaluation. The attachment to this ISG integrates the current staff approach into a revision of
ISG-5. The highlights of the changes include:
• Reflects October 1998 revisions to 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106.
• Expands and clarifies acceptance criteria associated with confinement analysis and
acceptance of “leak tight” testing instead of detailed confinement analysis.
NRC SFST ISG-6: Establishing minimum initial enrichment for the bounding design basis fuel assembly(s)
NRC SFST ISG-6: Establishing minimum initial enrichment for the bounding design basis fuel assembly(s)
The Standard Review Plan, NUREG-1536, Chapter 5, Section V, 2 recommends that “the
applicant calculate the source term on the basis of the fuel that will actually provide the
bounding source term,” and states that the applicant should, “either specify the minimum initial
enrichment or establish the specific source terms as operating controls and limits for cask use.”
A specified source term is difficult for most cask users to determine and for inspectors to verify.
NRC SFST ISG-7: Potential Generic Issue Concerning Cask Heat Transfer in a Transportation Accident
NRC SFST ISG-7: Potential Generic Issue Concerning Cask Heat Transfer in a Transportation Accident
Staff raised two major issues concerning the adverse effects of fission gases to the gas-mixture
thermal conductivity in a spent fuel canister in a post accident environment. The two major
concerns were: (1) the reduction of the thermal conductivity of the canister gas by the mixing of
fission gases expelled from failed fuel pins and (2) the resultant temperature and pressure rise
within the canister. Since the fission gas is typically of a lower conductivity than the cover gas,