The "Summary Report of SNF Isotopic Comparisons for the Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology" contains a summary of the analyses that compare SNF measured isotopic concentrations (radiochemical assays) to calculated SNF isotop~c concentrations (SAS2H module ·orScale4.3). The results of these analyses are used to support the validation of the isotopic models for spent commercial light water reactor (LWR) fuel.

This report evaluates the potential for directly disposing of licensed commercial Dual Purpose
Canisters (DPCs) inside waste package overpacks without reopening. The evaluation considers
the principal features of the DPC designs that have been licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) as these relate to the current designs of waste packages and as they relate to
disposability in the repository. Where DPC features appear to compromise future disposability,
those changes that would improve prospective disposability are identified.

This report provides details of dry storage cask systems and contents in U.S. for commercial light water
reactor fuel. Section 2 contains details on the canisters used to store approximately 86% of assemblies in
dry storage in the U.S. Transport cask details for bare fuels, dual purpose casks and canister transport
casks are included in Section 3. Section 4 details the inventory of those shutdown sites without any
operating reactors. Information includes the cask type deployed, transport license and status as well as

A methodology for performing and applying nuclear criticality safety calculations, for PWR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packages with actinide-only burnup credit, is described. The changes in the U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242, and Am-241 concentration with burnup are used in burnup credit criticality analyses. No credit for fission product neutron absorbers is taken. The methodology consists of five major steps. (1) Validate a computer code system to calculate isotopic concentrations of SNF created during burnup in the reactor core and subsequent decay.

A methodology for performing and applying nuclear criticality safety calculations, for PWR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packages with actinide-only burnup credit, is described. The changes in the U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242, and Am-241 concentration with burnup are used in burnup credit criticality analyses. No credit for fission product neutron absorbers is taken. The methodology consists of five major steps. (1) Validate a computer code system to calculate isotopic concentrations of SNF created during burnup in the reactor core and subsequent decay.

This presentation was given by Earl Easton at the 2011 National State Liaison Officers Conference in Bethesda, MD.

The presentation highlights the current state of spent nuclear fuel as well as the progress toward its ultimate disposal.

As nuclear power plants began to run out of storage capacity in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage pools, many nuclear operating companies added higher density pool storage racks to increase pool capacity. Most nuclear power plant storage pools have been re-racked one or more times. As many spent fuel storage pools were re-racked to the maximum extent possible, nuclear operating companies began to employ interim dry storage technologies to store SNF in certified casks and canister-based systems outside of the storage pool in independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs).

At the request of the U.S. Congress, the National Academies assessed the safety and
security of spent nuclear fuel stored in pools and dry casks at commercial nuclear power
plants in the United States. The public report can be viewed on the National Academies
Press website at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11263.html.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is evaluating the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stored in dry casks for extended time periods before transportation to a location where the SNF is further processed or permanently disposed.

Because there is currently no designated disposal site for used nuclear fuel in the United States, the nation faces the prospect of extended long‐term storage (i.e., >60 years) and deferred transportation of used fuel at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plant sites. Under U.S. federal regulations contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.42, the initial license term for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) must not exceed 40 years from the date of issuance. Licenses may be renewed by the U.S.

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

The issue of interim storage of used (spent)1 fuel is dependent on a number of key factors, some
of which are not known at this time but are the subject of this study. The first is whether or not
the Yucca Mountain Project continues or is cancelled such that it may be able to receive spent
fuel from existing and decommissioned nuclear power stations. The second is whether the United
States will pursue a policy of reprocessing and recycling nuclear fuel. The reprocessing and

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

This topical report describes the approach to the risk-informed, performance-based methodology to be used for performing postclosure criticality analyses for waste forms in the Monitored Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The risk-informed, performance-based methodology will be used during the licensing process to demonstrate how the potential for postclosure criticality will be limited and to demonstrate that public health and safety are protected against postclosure criticality.