DOE Yucca Implementation Letter
DOE Yucca Implementation Letter
Letter from the Congress of the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Letter from the Congress of the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report describes a methodology for performing postclosure criticality analyses within the repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. An important component of the postclosure criticality analysis is the calculation of conservative isotopic concentrations for spent nuclear fuel. This report documents the isotopic calculation methodology. The isotopic calculation methodology is shown to be conservative based upon current data for pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor spent nuclear fuel.
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is one of the most common corrosion-related causes for premature breach of metal structural components. SCC is the initiation and propagation of cracks in structural components due to three factors that must be present simultaneously (Jones 1992 [DIRS 169906], Section 8.1): metallurgical susceptibility, critical environment, and sustained tensile stresses.
This study provides results supporting the conclusion that the repository can be operated over a varying range of thermal modes and therefore temperatures. In particular, this work focused on limiting the peak, postclosure waste package surface temperature to less than 85 degrees Celsius, a possible limit due to corrosion considerations. These operating modes were compared by varying the waste package in drift spacing (0.1-2.83 meters), drift pitch (drift spacing centerline to centerline of 40-120 meters), ventilation duration (75-300 years), and ventilation efficiency (50-80%).
The purpose of this calculation is to determine the structural response of the Transportation, Aging, Disposal (TAD) waste package (WP) and the 5-Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste/Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel Short (5-DHLW/DOE SNF Short) co-disposal WP with emplacement pallet (EP) at room temperature and elevated temperatures for the complete drift collapse event sequence. the repository emplacement drift (RED) collapse will impose a pressure load due to the weight of the rubble rock and thermal expansion due to temperature rise as a result of lack of ventilation.
An Account of the Programs of Federal Agencies and Events That Have Led to the Selection of a Potential Site for a Geologic Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste
The purpose of this scientific analysis report, Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Igneous Scenario Criticality Evaluation, is to investigate the effects of an igneous intrusion event occurring in the repository on commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) stored in waste packages. This activity supports the Postclosure Criticality Department's development of bounding (design-basis) configurations for loading specifications and the evaluation of features, events, and processes (FEPs) that could lead to waste package criticality.
This report presents the analysis and conclusions with respect to disposal criticality for canisters containing aluminum-based fuels from research reactors. The analysis has been divided into three phases. Phase I, dealt with breached and flooded waste packages containing relatively intact canisters and intact internal (basket) structures; Phase II, the subject of this report, covers the degradation of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and structures internal to the codisposal waste package including high level waste (HLW), canisters, and criticality control material.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of the transportation, aging and disposal (TAD) canister-based systems.
This design calculation is a revision of the previous criticality evaluation of the operations and
processes that are performed in the Aging Facility. It will also demonstrate and assure that the
storage and aging operations to be performed in the Aging Facility meet the criticality safety
design criteria in the Project Design Criteria Document (BSC 2005i, Section 4.9.2.2), and the
nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the SNF Aging System Description Document
The purpose of this methods report is to document: (1) the origin, and the methods used in the development of a comprehensive list of features, events, and/or processes (FEPs) that could potentially affect the postclosure performance of the Yucca Mountain disposal system; (2) the methodology and guidance used to screen FEPs for inclusion or exclusion from Total System Performance Assessment for the License Application (TSPA-LA) analysis; (3) the methodology and guidance used to create scenario classes; and (4) compliance with NUREG-1804 (NRC 2003.
The means to prevent and control criticality must be addressed as part of the Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA) required for compliance with 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 180319], where the preclosure period covers the time prior to permanent closure activities. This technical report presents the nuclear criticality safety evaluation that documents the achievement of this objective.
This report presents a two-phased approach to develop and analyze a “thermal envelope” to represent the postclosure response of the repository to the anticipated range of repository design thermal loadings. In Phase 1 an estimated limiting waste stream (ELWS) is identified and analyzed to determine the extremes of average and local thermal loading conditions. The coldest thermal loading condition is represented by an emplacement drift loaded exclusively with high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and/or defense spent nuclear fuel (DSNF).
Hydrogen-induced cracking is characterized by the decreased ductility and fracture toughness of a material due to the absorption of atomic hydrogen in the metal crystal lattice. Corrosion is the source of hydrogen generation. For the current design of the engineered barrier without backfill, hydrogen-induced cracking may be a concern because the titanium drip shield can be galvanically coupled to rock bolts (or wire mesh), which may fall onto the drip shield, thereby creating conditions for hydrogen production by electrochemical reaction.
The purpose of this report is to evaluate the potential for penetration of the Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) waste package outer barrier by localized corrosion due to the deliquescence of soluble constituents in dust present on waste package surfaces. The results support a recommendation to exclude deliquescence-induced localized corrosion (pitting or crevice corrosion) of the outer barrier from the total system performance assessment for the license application (TSPA-LA).
The purpose of this scientific analysis report, CSNF Loading Curve Sensitivity Analysis, is to establish the required minimum burnup as a function of initial enrichment for both pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) that would allow permanent disposal of these waste forms in the geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. The relationship between the required minimum burnup and fuel assembly initial enrichment forms a loading curve.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate dissolved concentration limits (also referred to as solubility limits) of elements with radioactive isotopes under probable repository conditions, based on geochemical modeling calculations using geochemical modeling tools, thermodynamic databases, field measurements, and laboratory experiments.
This new report from the National Research Council’s Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board (NRSB) and the Transportation Research Board reviews the risks and technical and societal concerns for the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. Shipments are expected to increase as the U.S. Department of Energy opens a repository for spent fuel and high-level waste at Yucca Mountain, and the commercial nuclear industry considers constructing a facility in Utah for temporary storage of spent fuel from some of its nuclear waste plants.
Dear Representatives Upton and Shimkus,
At the direction of the President, the Secretary of Energy established the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America’s Nuclear Future and charged it with reviewing policies for
managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. We are serving as the Co-Chairmen of
the Commission and have taken note of your recent comments about the Commission’s
work.
Your comments echo those we have heard from several members of Congress and from
people across the country who believe the United States should not abandon the
This report presents the analyses and results for the potential occurrence of external criticality events which could result from plutonium waste forms emplaced in a geologic repository similar to the one being developed at Yucca Mountain. The analyses evaluate both the MOX spent fuel and the immobilized plutonium waste forms in a repository if the waste package has degraded and if the fissile material has migrated to the invert and out into the far-field.
The purpose of this analysis is to provide an initial radionuclide inventory (in grams per waste package) and associated uncertainty distributions for use in the Total System Performance Assessment for the License Application (TSPA-LA) in support of the license application for the repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. This document is intended for use in postclosure analysis only.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), as amended, authorized the DOE to develop and manage a Federal system for the disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW). The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste (OCRWM) was created to manage acceptance, transportation and disposal of SNF and HLW in a manner that protects public health, safety, and the environment; enhances national and energy security; and merits public confidence.