The Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee was formed to respond to the charge—set forth in the charter of the Blue Ribbon Commission—to evaluate existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs in terms of multiple criteria.

A methodology for performing and applying nuclear criticality safety calculations, for PWR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packages with actinide-only burnup credit, is described. The changes in the U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242, and Am-241 concentration with burnup are used in burnup credit criticality analyses. No credit for fission product neutron absorbers is taken. The methodology consists of five major steps. (1) Validate a computer code system to calculate isotopic concentrations of SNF created during burnup in the reactor core and subsequent decay.

A methodology for performing and applying nuclear criticality safety calculations, for PWR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packages with actinide-only burnup credit, is described. The changes in the U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242, and Am-241 concentration with burnup are used in burnup credit criticality analyses. No credit for fission product neutron absorbers is taken. The methodology consists of five major steps. (1) Validate a computer code system to calculate isotopic concentrations of SNF created during burnup in the reactor core and subsequent decay.

At the request of the U.S. Congress, the National Academies assessed the safety and
security of spent nuclear fuel stored in pools and dry casks at commercial nuclear power
plants in the United States. The public report can be viewed on the National Academies
Press website at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11263.html.

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) asked us to study whether
occupational safety and health conditions in today's U.S. nuclear industry are reasonably safe,
and if those conditions have improved since the Three Mile Island event in 1979. The BRC also
asked us to look to the future, to try to anticipate worker safety and health risks that should be
addressed by the industry, its government regulators and private watchdogs.
Over the eight weeks allotted, we performed a limited review of the literature and spoke with

At the request of the staff to the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (“BRC”), we have reviewed whether certain recommendations in the BRC’s July 29, 2011 Draft Report respecting near-term actions by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) or other officers or agencies in the Executive Branch can be implemented under existing law. These recommendations relate to:
(1) Initial steps to site, license and construct consolidated interim storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel (“spent fuel”);

This Memorandum analyzes issues related to the Standard Contract between the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) and the “utilities.” Beginning with a discussion of specific provisions of the Standard Contract, this Memorandum then analyzes the status of lawsuits involving the Standard Contract, reviews issues related to on-site storage of spent fuel and HLW, and assesses the prospects for modifying the current waste-disposal regime through Federal legislation or amendments to the Standard Contract.

The Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee was formed to respond to the charge—set forth in the charter of the BRC—to evaluate existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs in terms of multiple criteria.

This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004 (DIRS 167614).

This memo sets forth the Office of Standard Contract Management's current estimate of the US Government's liability in connection with the Government's partial breach of the "standard contracts" that it executed pursuant to the NWPA of 1982. The Office of Standard Contract Management estimates that liability, as of today and based on the analysis and qualifications set forth below, to be $15.4 billion.
...

This report presents a comprehensive description of the post-closure radiological safety assess- ment of a repository for spent fuel (SF), vitrified high-level waste (HLW) from the reprocessing of spent fuel and long-lived intermediate-level waste (ILW), sited in the Opalinus Clay of the Zürcher Weinland in northern Switzerland. This assessment has been carried out as part of the technical basis for Project Entsorgungsnachweis1, which also includes a synthesis of informa- tion from geological investigations of the Opalinus Clay and a report on engineering feasibility.

The Centralized Interim Storage Facility (CISF) is designed as a temporary, above-ground away-from-reactor spent fuel storage installation for up to 40,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). The design is non-site-specific but incorporates conservative environmental and design factors (e.g., 360 mph tornado and 0.75 g seismic loading) intended to be capable of bounding subsequent site-specific factors. Spent fuel is received in dual-purpose canister systems and/or casks already approved for transportation and storage by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The Law of 30 December 1991 [1] confers to Andra the mission of assessing the feasibility of a repository of high-level and long-lived (HLLL) waste in a deep geological formation.