The purpose of this calculation is to apply the process described in the TDR-DS0-NU-000001 Rev. 02, Preclosure Criticality Analysis Process Report (Ref. 2.2.25) to aid in establishing design and operational criteria important to criticality safety and to identify potential control parameters and their limits important to the criticality safety of commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) handling operations in the Wet Handling Facility (WHF)

This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development Department (WPDD) to provide an assessment of the present waste package design from a criticality risk standpoint. The specific objectives of this initial analysis are to:
1. Establish a process for determining the probability of waste package criticality as a function of time (in terms of a cumulative distribution function, probability distribution function, or expected number of criticalities in a specified time interval) for various waste package concepts;

The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of Department of Energy (DOE) standardized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) canisters.

The purpose of this calculation is to apply the process described in the Preclosure Criticality Analysis Process Report (Ref. 2.2.12) to establish the bias for keff calculations performed for commercial nuclear fuels using the MCNP code system. This bias will be used in criticality safety analyses as part of the basis for establishing the upper subcritical limit (USL). This calculation also defines the range of applicability (ROA) for which the bias may be used directly without need to consider additional penalties on the USL.

The means to prevent and control criticality must be addressed as part of the Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA) required for compliance with 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 180319], where the preclosure period covers the time prior to permanent closure activities. This technical report presents the nuclear criticality safety evaluation that documents the achievement of this objective.

This report proposes and documents a computational benchmark for the estimation of the
additional reactivity margin available in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from fission products and minor
actinides in a burnup-credit storage/transport environment, relative to SNF compositions
containing only the major actinides. The benchmark problem/configuration is a generic burnupcredit
cask designed to hold 68 boiling water reactor (BWR) spent nuclear fuel assemblies. The
purpose of this computational benchmark is to provide a reference configuration for the

This report has been prepared to support technical discussion of and planning for future
research supporting implementation of burnup credit for boiling-water reactor (BWR) spent fuel
storage in spent fuel pools and storage and transport cask applications. The review and
discussion in this report are based on knowledge and experience gained from work performed
in the United States and other countries, including experience with burnup credit for
pressurized-water reactor (PWR) spent fuel. Relevant physics and analysis phenomena are

The purpose of this directory is to make available a convenient source of information on package designs approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. To assist in identifying packages, an index by Model Number and corresponding Certificate of Compliance Number is included at the front of Volume 2. The report includes all package designs approved prior to the publication date of the directory as of September 2013.

This report presents a best-estimate probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to quantify the frequency of criticality accidents during railroad transportation of spent nuclear fuel casks. The assessment is of sufficient detail to enable full scrutiny of the model logic and the basis for each quantitative parameter contributing to criticality accident scenario frequencies. The report takes into account the results of a 2007 peer review of the initial version of this probabilistic risk assessment, which was published as EPRI Technical Report 1013449 in December 2006.

Spent nuclear fuel comprises a fraction of the hazardous materials packages shipped annually in the United States. In fact, at the present time, fewer than 100 packages of spent nuclear fuel are shipped annually. At the onset of spent fuel shipments to the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada, repository, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) expects to ship 400 - 500 spent fuel transport casks per year over the life of the facility.

This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development Department (WPDD) to determine the viability of the Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Glass waste package concept with respect to criticality regulatory requirements in compliance with the goals of the Waste Package Implementation Plan (Ref. 5.1) for conceptual design. These design calculations are performed in sufficient detail to provide a comprehensive comparison base with other design alternatives.

The Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) Waste Package Operations (WPO) of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management & Operating Contractor (CRWMS M&O) performed calculations to provide input for disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) (Ref. 1). The Shippingport PWR SNF has been considered for disposal at the proposed Yucca Mountain site.

Utilization of burnup credit in criticality safety analysis for long-term disposal of spent
nuclear fuel allows improved design efficiency and reduced cost due to the large mass of fissile
material that will be present in the repository. Burnup-credit calculations are based on depletion
calculations that provide a conservative estimate of spent fuel contents (in terms of criticality
potential), followed by criticality calculations to assess the value of the effective neutron

The purpose of this calculation is to estimate volumes, masses, and surface areas associated with (a) an empty Department of Energy (DOE) 18-inch diameter, 15-ft long spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canister, (b) an empty DOE 24-inch diameter, 15-ft long SNF canister, (c) Shippingport Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) SNF, and (d) the internal basket structure for the 18-in. canister that has been designed specifically to accommodate Seed fuel from the Shippingport LWBR.

This report investigates trends in the radiological decay properties and changes in relative nuclide importance associated with increasing enrichments and burnup for spent LWR fuel as they affect the areas of criticality safety, thermal analysis (decay heat), and shielding analysis of spent fuel transport and storage casks. To facilitate identifying the changes in the spent fuel compositions that most directly impact these application areas, the dominant nuclides in each area have been identified and ranked by importance.

The purpose of this calculation is to perform degraded mode criticality evaluations of plutonium disposed in a ceramic waste form and emplaced in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). A 5 Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Canister Waste Package (WP) design, incorporating the can-in-canister concept for plutonium immobilization is considered for this calculation. Each HLW glass pour canister contains 7 tubes. Each tube contains 4 cans, with 20 ceramic disks (immobilized plutonium) in each.

The purpose of these calculations is to characterize the criticality safety concerns for the storage of Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) nuclear fuel in a Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel (DOE SNF) canister in a co-disposal waste package. These results will be used to support the analysis that will be done to demonstrate concept viability related to use in the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) environment.

This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development Department (WPDD) to provide an assessment of the present waste package design from a criticality risk standpoint. The specific objectives of this initial analysis are to:
1. Establish a process for determining the probability of waste package criticality as a function of time (in terms of a cumulative distribution function, probability distribution function, or expected number of criticalities in a specified time interval) for various waste package concepts;

The purpose of this report is to document calculations of the number of waste packages that could be damaged in a potential future igneous event intersecting a repository at YuccaMountain. The analyses include disruption from an igneous intrusion and from an igneous eruption. The analyses also support the evaluation of the potential consequences from a future event as part of the total system performance assessment (TSPA) for the license application for the Yucca Mountain Project.

The purpose of this calculation is to establish the relative change in the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) due to the use of MCNP unique identifiers (ZAIDs) in Nuclear Criticality Calculations for Canister-Based Facilities - DOE SNF (Reference 2.2.1, Attachment 3, MCNP inputs.zip) that are different to the ZAIDs used in the Analysis of Critical Benchmark Experiments and Critical Limit Calculation for DOE SNF (Reference 2.2.5, Table 5-3).

The purpose of these calculations is to characterize the criticality safety concerns for the storage of Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) nuclear fuel in a Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel (DOE SNF) canister in a co-disposal waste package. These results will be used to support the analysis that will be done to demonstrate concept viability related to use in the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) environment.