The Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee was formed to respond to the charge—set forth in the charter of the Blue Ribbon Commission—to evaluate existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs in terms of multiple criteria.

Since a 1985 decision by President Reagan that a separate permanent repository for disposal of
defense high level waste was not required1, DOE has planned for disposal of all high-level waste
and spent fuel from national defense activities and DOE’s own research activities in a repository
for commercial waste developed under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). The Commission
has heard recommendations from some commenters2 that this decision be revisited, or even

There are more than 250 forms of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)­owned spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Due to the variety of the spent nuclear fuel, the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) has designated nine representative fuel groups for disposal criticality analyses based on fuel matrix, primary fissile isotope, and enrichment. For each fuel group, a fuel type that represents the characteristics of all fuels in that group has been selected for detailed analysis.

A methodology for performing and applying nuclear criticality safety calculations, for PWR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packages with actinide-only burnup credit, is described. The changes in the U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242, and Am-241 concentration with burnup are used in burnup credit criticality analyses. No credit for fission product neutron absorbers is taken. The methodology consists of five major steps. (1) Validate a computer code system to calculate isotopic concentrations of SNF created during burnup in the reactor core and subsequent decay.

A methodology for performing and applying nuclear criticality safety calculations, for PWR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) packages with actinide-only burnup credit, is described. The changes in the U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242, and Am-241 concentration with burnup are used in burnup credit criticality analyses. No credit for fission product neutron absorbers is taken. The methodology consists of five major steps. (1) Validate a computer code system to calculate isotopic concentrations of SNF created during burnup in the reactor core and subsequent decay.

The objective of this analysis is to characterize a codisposal canister containing MIT or ORR fuel in the Five-Pack defense high level waste (DHLW) waste package (WP) to demonstrate concept viability related to use in the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) environment for the postclosure time frame. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the disposal criticality and shielding issues for the DHLW WP and establish DHLW WP and codisposal canister compatibility with the MGDS, and to provide criticality and shielding evaluations for the preliminary DHLW WP design.

At the request of the U.S. Congress, the National Academies assessed the safety and
security of spent nuclear fuel stored in pools and dry casks at commercial nuclear power
plants in the United States. The public report can be viewed on the National Academies
Press website at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11263.html.

Dear Tim:
As we work to complete our final recommendations to the Secretary by January 29, 2012,
we have determined that our efforts would be aided by the formation of an ad hoc
subcommittee to investigate the issue of co‐mingling of defense and commercial wastes.
Specifically, the ad hoc subcommittee would review and make a recommendation to the
Commission on the issue of whether the 1985 Presidential decision to co‐mingle defense
and commercial wastes for disposal should be revisited in light of changes that have

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) asked us to study whether
occupational safety and health conditions in today's U.S. nuclear industry are reasonably safe,
and if those conditions have improved since the Three Mile Island event in 1979. The BRC also
asked us to look to the future, to try to anticipate worker safety and health risks that should be
addressed by the industry, its government regulators and private watchdogs.
Over the eight weeks allotted, we performed a limited review of the literature and spoke with

At the request of the staff to the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (“BRC”), we have reviewed the following questions:
1. Is there legal authority for DOE or any other entity to undertake to site a repository for “co-mingled” nuclear materials (i.e., civilian and defense spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW)) at any site other than Yucca Mountain?

The Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee was formed to respond to the charge—set forth in the charter of the BRC—to evaluate existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs in terms of multiple criteria.

The objective of this analysis is to characterize the criticality safety aspects of a degraded Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel (DOESNF) canister containing Masachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or Oak Ridge Research (ORR) fuel in the Five Pack defense high level waste (DHLW) waste package to demonstrate concept viability related to use in the Minded Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) environment for the postclosure time frame.

This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004 (DIRS 167614).

Gentlemen,
In accordance with the charter of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future and as the Secretary's designee, I approve your request to establish an ad hoc subcommittee to review and make a recommendation to the Commission regarding the co-mingling of defense and commercial waste.
This letter also serves to appoint Dr. Allison Macfarlane as the chair of the subcommittee and the membership of the subcommittee as identified in your letter to me dated October 31, 2011.

Thep purpose of this calculation is to perform degraded mode criticality evaluations of plutonium disposed in a ceramic waste form and emplaced in a Monitored geologic Repository (MGR). A 5 Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Canister Waste Package (WP) design, incorporating the can-in-canister concept for plutonium immobilization is considered in this calculation. Each HLW glass pour canister contains 7 tubes. Each tube contains 4 cans, with 20 ceramic disks (immobilized plutonium) in each.

This report presents a comprehensive description of the post-closure radiological safety assess- ment of a repository for spent fuel (SF), vitrified high-level waste (HLW) from the reprocessing of spent fuel and long-lived intermediate-level waste (ILW), sited in the Opalinus Clay of the Zürcher Weinland in northern Switzerland. This assessment has been carried out as part of the technical basis for Project Entsorgungsnachweis1, which also includes a synthesis of informa- tion from geological investigations of the Opalinus Clay and a report on engineering feasibility.

The Centralized Interim Storage Facility (CISF) is designed as a temporary, above-ground away-from-reactor spent fuel storage installation for up to 40,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). The design is non-site-specific but incorporates conservative environmental and design factors (e.g., 360 mph tornado and 0.75 g seismic loading) intended to be capable of bounding subsequent site-specific factors. Spent fuel is received in dual-purpose canister systems and/or casks already approved for transportation and storage by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The Law of 30 December 1991 [1] confers to Andra the mission of assessing the feasibility of a repository of high-level and long-lived (HLLL) waste in a deep geological formation.