Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013

The purpose of this analysis is to document Waste Package Development Department (WPPD) MCNP evaluations of benchmark solution Laboratory Critical Experiments (LCE's). The objective of this analysis is to quantify the ability of the MCNP 4A (Reference 5.4) code system to accurately calculate the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) for various measured critical (i.e., keff=1.0) configurations.

The purpose of the Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Shipments Institutional Program was to meet the goals and commitments of the Implementation Strategy Plan for the FRR SNF Shipments. This program provided a systematic approach to planning, implementing, evaluating, and validating preparedness for the first west coast shipment of SNF from Asian countries to the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL).

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from point of origin to destination at a federal storage or disposal facility. Section 180(c), written into the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987, requires OCRWM to prepare public safety officials along the routes for these shipments.

The issue of interim storage of used (spent)1 fuel is dependent on a number of key factors, some
of which are not known at this time but are the subject of this study. The first is whether or not
the Yucca Mountain Project continues or is cancelled such that it may be able to receive spent
fuel from existing and decommissioned nuclear power stations. The second is whether the United
States will pursue a policy of reprocessing and recycling nuclear fuel. The reprocessing and

Thep purpose of this calculation is to perform degraded mode criticality evaluations of plutonium disposed in a ceramic waste form and emplaced in a Monitored geologic Repository (MGR). A 5 Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Canister Waste Package (WP) design, incorporating the can-in-canister concept for plutonium immobilization is considered in this calculation. Each HLW glass pour canister contains 7 tubes. Each tube contains 4 cans, with 20 ceramic disks (immobilized plutonium) in each.

Every year, more than 300 million packages of hazardous material are shipped in the
United States (U.S.). Most of the hazardous material shipped – about 97 percent – is
flammable, explosive, corrosive or poisonous. About 1 percent – three million packages –
of the hazardous materials shipped annually contains radioactive material, most of them
from medical and industrial applications. [DOT 1998b]
Spent nuclear fuel comprises a very small fraction of the hazardous materials packages

Dear Secretary Chu:
At the direction of the President, you charged the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s
Nuclear Future with reviewing policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel
cycle and recommending a new plan. We thank you for choosing us to serve as Co-
Chairmen of the Commission and for selecting the talented and dedicated set of
Commissioners with whom we serve.
We have sought to ensure that our review is comprehensive, open and inclusive. The
Commission and its subcommittees have heard from hundreds of individuals and

This report evaluates the radiological impacts during postulated accidents associated with the
transportation of spent nuclear fuel to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, using the
RADTRAN 5.5 computer code developed by Sandia National Laboratories. RADTRAN 5.5 can
be applied to estimate the risks associated both with incident-free transportation of radioactive
materials as well as with accidents that may be assumed to occur during transportation. Incidentfree
transportation risks for transport of spent nuclear fuel to Yucca Mountain were evaluated in

This paper presents an evaluation of the amount of burnup credit needed for high-density casks to
transport the current U.S. inventory of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies. A prototypic
32-assembly cask and the current regulatory guidance were used as bases for this evaluation.
By comparing actual pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) discharge data (i.e., fuel burnup and initial
enrichment specifications for fuel assemblies discharged from U.S. PWRs) with actinide-only-based

The objective of this calculation is to determine the structural response of the 5-DHLW/DOE (Defense High Level Waste/Department of Energy) SNF (Spent Nuclear Fuel) Short Co-disposal Waste Package (WP) when subjected (while in the horizontal orientation emplaced in the drift) to a collision by a loaded (with WP) Transport and Emplacement Vehicle (TEV) due to an over-run. The scope of this calculation is limited to reporting the calculation results in terms of maximum total stress intensities (Sis) in the outer corrosion barrier (dCB).

This new report from the National Research Council’s Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board (NRSB) and the Transportation Research Board reviews the risks and technical and societal concerns for the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. Shipments are expected to increase as the U.S. Department of Energy opens a repository for spent fuel and high-level waste at Yucca Mountain, and the commercial nuclear industry considers constructing a facility in Utah for temporary storage of spent fuel from some of its nuclear waste plants.

The Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste is a framework for moving toward a sustainable program to deploy an integrated system capable of transporting, storing, and disposing of used nuclear fuel1 and high-level radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power generation, defense, national security and other activities.

The purpose of this document is to evaluate the potential for criticality for the fissile material that could accumulate in the near-field (invert) and in the far-field (host rock) beneath the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) codisposal waste packages (WPs) as they degrade in the proposed monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. The scope of this calculation is limited to the following DOE SNF types: Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), Enrico Fermi, Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), Fort St.

The objective of this calculation is to characterize the nuclear criticality safety concerns
associated with the codisposal of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Enrico Fermi (EF) Spent
Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in a 5-Defense High-Level Waste (5-DHLW) Waste Package (WP) and
placed in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). The scope of this calculation is limited to
the determination of the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) for the degraded mode
internal configurations of the codisposal WP. The results of this calculation and those of Ref. 8

This calculation file uses the MCNP neutron transport code to determine the range of parameters for Pressurized Water Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel contained with a 21 PWR waste package (WP). Four base geometry patterns were considered in this work and included the following: intact fuel assemblies with intact WP internal components, intact fuel assemblies with degraded WP internal components, degraded fuel assemblies with intact WP internal components, and degraded fuel assemblies with degraded WP internal components.

The objective of this calculation is to document the Grand Gulf Unit 1 (GG1) reactivity calculations for sixteen critical statepoints in cycles 4 through 8. The GG1 reactor is a boiling water reactor (BWR) owned and operated by Entergy Operations Inc. The Commercial Reactor Criticality (CRC) evaluations support the development and validation of the neutronic models used for criticality analyses involving commercial spent nuclear fuel to be placed in a geologic repository. This calculation is performed as part of the evaluation in the CRC program.

This is the Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Project Director's presentation on Near Term Planning for Stroage and Transportation of Used Nuclear Fuel presented to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management on January 14, 2013 in Arlington Va.

The objective of this calculation is to evaluate the criticality potential for co-disposal waste packages affected by an igneous intrusion disruptive event in the emplacement drifts. The scope of this calculation is limited to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) types in DOE standardized SNF canisters or Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Canisters.

The Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) Transportation Task commenced in October 2010. As its first task, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) compiled a list of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of transportation systems and their possible degradation mechanisms during extended storage. The list of SSCs and the associated degradation mechanisms [known as features, events, and processes (FEPs)] were based on the list of used nuclear fuel (UNF) storage system SSCs and degradation mechanisms developed by the UFD Storage Task (Hanson et al. 2011).

The purpose of this calculation is to perform nuclear criticality calculations for High-Level Waste (HLW) glass to support the criticality safety analysis of normal operations and off-normal conditions associated with the receipt, handling and loading of HLW glass canisters into 5-DHLW/DOE SNF Waste Packages (WPs) and 2-MCO/2-DHLW WPs in the surface facilities, in addition to the emplacement of loaded and sealed WPs in the sub-surface facility.

The purpose of this calculation is to characterize the criticality safety concerns for the codisposal of Shippingport pressurized water reactor (SP PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) contained in a standardized Department of Energy (DOE) SNF canister, and high-level waste (HLW) glass in a waste package (WP) placed in a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). The result of this calculation will be used to evaluate criticality issues and provide input for the DOE SNF canister design, referred to as "the canister" in this document.

This test protocols report presents the NRC staff’s preliminary plans for an experimental phase of the Package Performance Study (PPS), which is examining the response of transportation casks to extreme transportation accident conditions. The staff proposes to conduct tests of full-scale rail and full-scale truck casks including a high-speed impact with an unyielding surface followed by an extreme fire test. The NRC has a contract in place with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to conduct the impact and fire tests and to carry out a series of analyses to support the test program.

This analysis is prepared by the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) Waste Package Development Department (WPDD) to determine the viability of the Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Glass waste package concept with respect to criticality regulatory requirements in compliance with the goals of the Waste Package Implementation Plan (Ref. 5.1) for conceptual design. These design calculations are performed in sufficient detail to provide a comprehensive comparison base with other design alternatives.

The objective of this analysis is to characterize the criticality safety aspects of a degraded Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel (DOE-SNF) canister containing Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or Oak Ridge Research (ORR) fuel in the Five-Pack Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) waste package to demonstrate concept viability related to use in the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) environment for the postclosure time frame.