Crystal River Unit 3 License Renewal
Crystal River Unit 3 License Renewal
Crystal River Unit 3 License Renewal Application being renewed by Florida Power Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc.
Crystal River Unit 3 License Renewal Application being renewed by Florida Power Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc.
This report presents the analysis and conclusions with respect to disposal criticality for canisters containing aluminum-based fuels from research reactors. The analysis has been divided into three phases. Phase I, dealt with breached and flooded waste packages containing relatively intact canisters and intact internal (basket) structures; Phase II, the subject of this report, covers the degradation of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and structures internal to the codisposal waste package including high level waste (HLW), canisters, and criticality control material.
Thep purpose of this calculation is to perform degraded mode criticality evaluations of plutonium disposed in a ceramic waste form and emplaced in a Monitored geologic Repository (MGR). A 5 Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW) Canister Waste Package (WP) design, incorporating the can-in-canister concept for plutonium immobilization is considered in this calculation. Each HLW glass pour canister contains 7 tubes. Each tube contains 4 cans, with 20 ceramic disks (immobilized plutonium) in each.
This validation report supports the issuance of Version 6.0 of the Total System Model (TSM, BSC 2007a) that is described in the TSM User Manual (UM, BSC 2007b) and the TSM Preprocessor (TSMPP) User Manual (BSC 2007c). This report assumes the reader has detailed, working knowledge of the TSM functions and the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) operations. This report is based on an earlier document, Validation Report: Total System Model Version 5.0 Report Generators (BSC 2007d) that supported TSM Version 5.0.
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
The Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CY) today announced that the State of Connecticut’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has approved CY’s application for a Stewardship Permit for its former plant site in Haddam CT. The approval marks a significant milestone in the decommissioning of the plant site.
The first objective of this calculation is the identification of the degraded configurations of the Enhanced Design Alternatives (EDA) II design that have some possibility of criticality and that can occur within 10,000 years of placement in the repository. The next objective is to evaluate the criticality of these configurations and to estimate the probability of occurrence for those configurations that could support criticality.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform waste-form specific nuclear criticality safety calculations to aid in establishing criticality safety design criteria, and to identify design and process parameters that are potentially important to the criticality safety of the transportation, aging and disposal (TAD) canister-based systems.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform an example criticality evaluation for degraded internal configurations of a boiling water reactor (BWR) waste package (WP) containing 44 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies. The BWR assembly design considered is based on the General Electric (GE) 8x8 assembly (see section 5.1). Depletion analyses for various assembly average enrichment and burnup (expressed as gigawatt days/metric ton Uranium; GWd/MTU) combinations are performed using the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S sequence of SCALE 4.3 (CSCI:30011-2002; Ref. 7.5).
Construction workers were and are considered temporary workers at many construction sites. Since WWII, large numbers of construction workers were employed at US DOE nuclear weapons sites for periods ranging from a few days to over 30 years. These workers performed tasks during new construction and maintenance, repair, renovation, and demolition of existing facilities.
This design calculation is a revision of the previous criticality evaluation of the operations and
processes that are performed in the Aging Facility. It will also demonstrate and assure that the
storage and aging operations to be performed in the Aging Facility meet the criticality safety
design criteria in the Project Design Criteria Document (BSC 2005i, Section 4.9.2.2), and the
nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the SNF Aging System Description Document
This briefing paper is a component of the comprehensive briefing package developed for the Negotiator, and describes previous DOE experience in its attempt to site an MRS facility. The Background section highlights, in chronological order, significant events in DOE's MRS siting history from enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to the issuance of the "Report to Congress on Reassessment of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program" in November 1989.
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
Transport of the damaged core materials from the Unit 2 reactor of the Three
Mile Island Nuclear Power Station (TMI-2) to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL) for examination and storage presented many technical and institutional
challenges, including assessing the ability to transport the damaged core;
removing and packaging core debris in ways suitable for transport; developing a
transport package that could both meet Federal regulations and interface with the
Presented at the 10th Meeting of the U.S.-Argentina Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August 26, 2013
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
Slides - 2014 WM Symposia, March 2-6, 2014, Phoenix, AZ
This report attempts to summarize and consolidate the existing knowledge on axial
burnup distribution issues that are important to burnup credit criticality safety calculations.
Recently released Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff guidance permits limited burnup
credit, and thus, has prompted resolution of the axial burnup distribution issue. The reactivity
difference between the neutron multiplication factor (keff) calculated with explicit representation
The purpose of this methods report is to document: (1) the origin, and the methods used in the development of a comprehensive list of features, events, and/or processes (FEPs) that could potentially affect the postclosure performance of the Yucca Mountain disposal system; (2) the methodology and guidance used to screen FEPs for inclusion or exclusion from Total System Performance Assessment for the License Application (TSPA-LA) analysis; (3) the methodology and guidance used to create scenario classes; and (4) compliance with NUREG-1804 (NRC 2003.
The Centralized Interim Storage Facility (CISF) is designed as a temporary, above-ground away-from-reactor spent fuel storage installation for up to 40,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). The design is non-site-specific but incorporates conservative environmental and design factors (e.g., 360 mph tornado and 0.75 g seismic loading) intended to be capable of bounding subsequent site-specific factors. Spent fuel is received in dual-purpose canister systems and/or casks already approved for transportation and storage by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The means to prevent and control criticality must be addressed as part of the Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA) required for compliance with 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 180319], where the preclosure period covers the time prior to permanent closure activities. This technical report presents the nuclear criticality safety evaluation that documents the achievement of this objective.
Presented at the NEI Used Fuel Management Conference, St. Petersburg, FL, May 7-9, 2013
US policy for management of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and high level radioactive wastes (HLRW) is at a crossroads, and the success of new policy directions will depend in part on broad public acceptance and support. In this paper I provide an overview of the evidence concerning the beliefs and concerns of members of the American public regarding UNF and HLNW. I also characterize the evidence on American’s policy preferences for management of these materials.